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DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND RECOGNITION OF 
JUDGMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MATTERS* 
PROFESSOR ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS** AND  
PROFESSOR JANE C. GINSBURG*** 
INTRODUCTION 
The proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters is currently drafted to cover 
most fields of private litigation, including intellectual property1.  However, 
as those following the Hague process are aware, the Convention has run 
into considerable difficulties. There is currently reason to be concerned that 
it may not be promulgated at all, or that if it is promulgated, that it will be 
reduced in scope and cover only select areas of litigation, likely not to 
include intellectual property.  This proposal is meant to spur the intellectual 
property bar to consider whether it would be desirable to create a regime 
for international enforcement of intellectual property law judgments in the 
event that efforts at the Hague do not come to fruition in a manner that 
covers disputes in this area.  A second question is whether, even if 
proceedings at the Hague do go forward, an instrument aimed exclusively 
at intellectual property matters would have advantages over a convention of 
more general scope.  Such a convention could be adopted under the 
auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) or 
through the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). 
There are several reasons to believe that an instrument drafted 
 
*Thanks to Graeme Austin, Joachim Bonell, Ruth Day, François Dessemontet, Graeme Dinwoodie, 
Jonathan Franklin, Catherine Kessedjian, Andreas Lowenfeld, and Linda Silberman, and to the 
commentators at the Chicago-Kent College of Law Symposium on “Constructing Intellectual Property 
Law: The Role of National Courts,” Oct. 18–19, 2001.  This work was supported by the Filomen 
D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund of New York University School of Law, and by a 
summer research grant from Columbia Law School. 
The American Law Institute has begun a project to base Principles of Jurisdiction, Conflict of Laws and 
Recognition of Judgments in Transnational Intellectual Property Matters on the Draft Convention>  The 
Reporters for the Principles are Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg, and Professor François 
Dessemontet, of the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. 
** Pauline Newman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. 
***  Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University School of 
Law. 
 1. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, drafts at 
http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (Oct. 30, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Draft Hague 
Convention]. 
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specifically for intellectual property disputes would be particularly 
advantageous.  First, as it stands, the proposed Hague Convention is mainly 
aimed at facilitating the enforcement of judgments; it includes features that 
would also make the adjudication of multinational disputes more efficient, 
but that is not its primary goal.  Yet, for intellectual property disputes, 
efficiency should be a principal target.  Modern distribution methods, 
particularly satellite and Internet transmissions, make it increasing likely 
that intellectual property rights will be exploited simultaneously in more 
than one territory.  The ability to consolidate claims arising from these 
usages in one court, with the expectation that the judgment of that court 
will be recognized in all convention States, could reduce costs for all sides, 
conserve judicial resources on an international basis, and promote 
consistent outcomes. 
Second, a convention drafted for intellectual property disputes can 
take account of issues uniquely raised by the intangibility of the rights in 
issue.  For example, where a general convention’s jurisdiction provisions 
speak generally of “acts,” “omissions,” and their foreseeability, an 
instrument on intellectual property disputes can be geared specifically to 
the events that comprise infringement.  Where a general convention may be 
concerned with curtailing forum shopping by potential plaintiffs, an 
intellectual property agreement can also consider the ability of a potential 
defendant to gain litigation advantages through the choice of the location of 
the activities that give rise to infringement.  In certain situations, the 
propriety of expanding jurisdiction depends on the possibility of 
inconsistent outcomes; a convention tailored to intellectual property can 
specify what that term means in the context of public goods. 
An instrument for intellectual property litigation can also deal 
specifically with matters of unique concern to the creative community.  The 
strong link between culture on the one hand, and intellectual production 
and utilization on the other, means that the territor iality of these rights is of 
crucial importance: individual nations must be able to retain some control 
over the local conditions under which these products are created, exploited, 
and accessed.  At the same time, an approach that creates new avenues for 
cross-cultural enrichment needs to be considered.  While it would be 
difficult to develop choice of law rules in the context of a general 
convention, it is possible to consider them here, where inherent territorial 
limits are well established in domestic legislation, case law, and 
longstanding international instruments. Similarly, the circumstances where 
trans-border injunctions are permissible can be specified to include 
consideration of cultural, health, and safety issues.  Other issues of prime 
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interest to the information industries can also be considered.  For example; 
provisions on contract disputes can be tailored to deal with mass-market 
contracts, which are becoming prevalent in certain intellectual property 
transactions; provisions on infringement can be made sensitive to the 
interests of the “new media,” such as Internet Service Providers. 
Most important, the convention can be confined to rights covered by 
the intellectual property part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“TRIPs Agreement”) and open to signature only to countries that 
have joined the WTO and fully implemented the TRIPs Agreement.2  Since 
these are countries that have agreed to enforce intellectual property law and 
are subject to dispute resolution proceedings if they fail to do so, these 
limitations would reduce concerns, sometimes expressed in connection 
with the draft Hague Convention, that forum shopping will undermine the 
delicate balance that each nation has struck between the rights of 
intellectual property users and owners.  And although dispute resolution 
under the WTO cannot provide litigants with a substitute for a centralized 
and authoritative appellate body (such as the US Supreme Court or the 
European Court of Justice), it can provide assurance of transparent and 
efficient judicial process, along with institutional mechanisms (such as 
dispute resolution panels, the Dispute Settlement Board, and the Council 
for TRIPs) for examining intellectual property law as it develops through 
consolidated adjudication of multinational disputes. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This proposal is adapted from the October 30, 1999 text of the Hague 
Conference Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters.3  Like the proposed Hague Convention, the 
right to enforce a judgment in member States depends on whether the court 
issuing the judgment enjoyed an approved basis of jurisdiction over the 
litigants.  However, alterations have been made to better tailor the 
convention to intangible rights and to the needs of the creative community, 
including both producers and users of intellectual products.  The principal 
areas where changes have been made are as follows: 
1. Scope.  The Convention would be open only to TRIPs implementers 
 
 2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. 
 3. The 1999 version of the Hague Convention is not the most recent draft.  However, it is the 
version under consideration at the time this project began and remains the only completed rendition of a 
judgments convention.  Accordingly, it forms the basis of this project.  Where ideas were taken from 
later revisions, they are expressly noted. 
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and, with three additions and one exception, it would cover the same rights 
covered by the TRIPs Agreement. 
The first addition is sound recordings.  Although the combination of 
the Berne Convention4 and the TRIPs Agreement cover the rights of 
composers and performers with respect to the making of sound recordings 
and the rights of producers as to the reproduction of sound recordings, 
communication to the public is not covered. At the same time, however, 
there appears to be international consensus that communication of the 
sound recordings (performance rights) should be protected against at least 
some kinds of unauthorized communication to the public (WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty).5  Because these instruments adopt 
principles akin to those found in the TRIPs Agreement, and because 
enforcing rights under these instruments raises problems similar to those 
arising in litigation involving TRIPs Agreement rights, communication 
rights are included in this Convention. 
The second and third additions are disputes over domain names and 
rights specified in the Paris Convention. 6  These are not yet clearly fully 
protected by TRIPs.  Again, because the principles of protection and the 
problems of enforcement are so similar to the rights clearly covered by the 
TRIPs Agreement, they are included in the scope of this Convention. 
The exception is patent litigation, where the expertise required for 
accurate decision making, coupled with the low incidence of simultaneous 
multinational infringements, makes the benefits of the Convention unlikely 
to outweigh the costs.  Although this draft demonstrates [in brackets] how 
patent litigation could be treated to min imize costs, it takes the position, 
elaborated upon in the commentary, that patent disputes should remain 
outside the Convention, leaving international concepts concerning 
consolidation of worldwide disputes and enforcement of foreign judgments 
to develop on their own. 
2. Jurisdiction.  Unlike the Brussels Convention,7 which attempts to 
 
 4. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last 
revised at Paris,  July 24, 1971 (amended 1979), S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 
[hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
 5. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 
I.L.M. 76. 
 6. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at 
Stockholm, July 14, 1967 (amended 1979), 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris 
Convention]. 
 7. 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969) (text as 
amended by the Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and to the Protocol on Its Interpretation by the Court of 
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use personal jurisdiction as a way to identify one forum as the single most 
appropriate location for the resolution of a particular dispute, and unlike the 
Hague Convention, which uses personal jurisdiction to create a narrow 
range of appropriate choices, this Convention identifies a set of fora with 
adjudicatory authority over the parties.  In part, this is a consequence of the 
commitment to consolidation and cooperation.  The parties’ choices need 
not be narrowed if all courts seized with parallel litigation will, ultimately, 
consult with one another and with the parties to find the best place to 
adjudicate the entire dispute.  Conversely, the courts and parties can select 
a better forum (in terms of convenience for the parties and witnesses, 
expertise of the decision maker, and relationship to the dispute) if there are 
several courts that enjoy adjudicatory authority.  In part, this decision also 
emanates from the view that forum shopping in intellectual property 
disputes cannot, in any event, be controlled through personal jurisdiction 
rules: intangible rights and infringements can be reified in too many 
locations to make personal jurisdiction an effective limit on potential fora. 
Like the proposed Hague Convention, this is a “mixed” convention.  It 
describes bases of jurisdiction that are predicates to enforcement in all 
member States and it describes bases of jurisdiction that are prohibited in 
cases involving foreign habitual residents of member States.  It leaves 
member States free to decide for themselves the conditions under which 
judgments predicated on other bases of jurisdiction are enforceable. 
3. Contract disputes.  Because arbitration is now a common way to 
resolve intellectual property disputes, this proposal makes membership in 
the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) a precondition.8 
Mass-market contracts (sometimes called “shrinkwrap” or “click 
through” agreements) are also becoming increasingly common in 
intellectual property transactions.  The enforceability of these agreements 
has been quite controversial and the Convention takes the position that the 
inability to negotiate does raise special concerns.  Accordingly, the 
enforceability of any contract provision affecting the place of dispute 
resolution is subject to a requirement of negotiation or, in nonnegotiated 
 
Justice, reprinted at 18 I.L.M. 21 (1979))[hereinafter Brussels Convention]; see also  Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 
O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989) [hereinafter Lugano Convention].  The Brussels 
Convention is currently being revised.  See Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
art. 28, 2001 O.J. (L 012) 1, 9 [hereinafter Revised Brussels].  Unless otherwise noted, references are to 
the current version of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. 
 8. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
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contracts, reasonableness in the choice of forum.  Factors taken into 
account in assessing the reasonableness of the chosen forum include 
whether, in the absence of a forum-selection clause, the chosen forum 
would have had jurisdiction over the nondrafting party. 
4. Infringement actions.  This instrument adapts jurisdictional 
doctrines regarding tort actions to tailor them to the context of intellectual 
property infringement and to the issues raised by the distribution of works 
in a digital environment.  In addition, this proposal deals with “new media” 
defendants, such as Internet Service Providers.  US law does not require 
special procedural protection for media defendants because substantive law 
has many explicit safeguards on the use of litigation to chill expression.  In 
the absence of such safeguards in the domestic laws of every member State, 
it was thought necessary to create procedural protections in the form of 
immunity from suit in locations where contacts are purely passive. 
5. Consolidation.  A central insight animating this proposal is that 
efficient adjudication of intellectual property disputes is a benefit—to the 
parties, to the nations whose judicial resources would otherwise be 
redundantly utilized, and to the development of sound intellectual property 
law.  Both US and European laws have mechanisms to promote 
consolidation, and the techniques of both systems are invoked here. 
a) The multiple -defendant and third-party provisions of the 1999 draft 
of the Hague Convention are utilized to expand the number of courts with 
adjudicatory power over all the defendants.  These provisions have, 
however, been altered to make them compatible with the US conception of 
due process. 
b) The lis pendens provision of the 1999 draft of the Hague 
Convention has been utilized to consolidate before a court first seized with 
a coercive action, all transactionally related claims arising from a single 
territory’s intellectual property rights. 
c) For cases where parallel litigation is ongoing in several territories, 
the consolidation provision of the Brussels Convention has been adapted to 
encourage all of the courts seized with parts of a multinational dispute to 
cooperate with one another and with the parties to choose a forum for 
centralized dispute resolution. 
d) Consolidation is further promoted by giving each court unila teral 
power under a US-style forum non conveniens doctrine to suspend 
proceedings in favor of a more appropriate forum.  At the same time, this 
doctrine is limited to prevent courts from dismissing causes of action 
simply because they are based on foreign law. 
e) The proposal allows parties to promote complete resolution of their 
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disputes by permitting them to assert supplemental claims, such as 
transactionally related counterclaims, including counterclaims for 
declarations of rights.  The proposal could go further and use US-style res 
judicata  law to require the parties to assert transactionally related claims 
(under penalty of claim and issue preclusion), but does not do so out of 
deference to the less aggressive nature of res judicata  law in other parts of 
the world. 
6. Remedies.  This proposal makes clear that the monetary and 
injunctive awards rendered by courts with proper authority over the parties 
must be recognized by all member States.  But there are exceptions.  
Compensatory relief must always be recognized, even if based on statutory 
amounts rather than proof of actual damages.  However, exemplary and 
punitive awards are recognized only to the extent recognized by the 
enforcing jurisdiction. Both permanent and preliminary injunctions must 
generally be recognized.  Moreover, courts may decline to enforce 
injunctions where its territory’s health, safety, or fundamental cultural 
policies are at stake, but normally only if damages would afford effective 
relief in that territory.  Courts other than the one where the action is 
pending are also able to order enforceable preliminary injunctive relief, but 
such relief must be limited to the territory of the court and to its territorial 
rights. 
7. Choice of law.  One reason that segments of the intellectual 
property bar have been opposed to the draft Hague Convention is that they 
fear that the territorial nature of intellectual property law will be lost.  
Because this notion is mainly based on the risk that a court will apply the 
wrong law to a dispute (this is most often expressed as the court will apply 
forum law to foreign activities), consideration was given to incorporating 
choice of law rules into the Convention, and to making enforcement turn on 
both an appropriate basis of personal jurisdiction and an application of 
appropriate law.  The problem with this approach is that it could lead, in 
essence, to relitigation of every case in the enforcing court.  Nonetheless, 
because the use of inappropriate law is a special danger in intellectual 
property litigation, consideration is being given to adding a new ground for 
nonrecognition to those listed in the draft Hague Convention.  This 
provision would permit a court where recognition is sought to deny 
enforcement when the rendering court’s choice of law was arbitrary or 
unreasonable.  Indicia of arbitrariness and unreasonableness would be 
worked out in commentary. 
The text of the proposed Convention is immediately below.  It is 
followed by draft comments.  The intent of this project is to demonstrate 
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that it is feasible to draft an international agreement on enforcing 
intellectual property judgments; should such a proposal go forward, its 
provisions would  be subject to negotiation and revision.  Many issues 
require further elaboration.  The remedies sections await further 
consideration of choice of law issues.  Specifics about choice of law also 
need to be considered in light of the Rome Convention on Contracts and an 
eventual Rome Convention on Torts.9  Should a Hague Judgments 
Convention that excluded intellectual property be adopted, work on the 
interaction between the two instruments would be necessary.  Work is also 
needed on the relationship between this Convention and the American Law 
Institute International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project10 and on how 
litigation in nonmember States will be treated. 
DRAFT CONVENTION 
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in 
Intellectual Property Matters 
Preliminary matters: coverage 
*This is a draft Convention on jurisdiction and recognition of 
judgments. 
*Countries eligible to join the Convention are WTO members whose 
obligations under the TRIPs Agreement have come due.  The Convention 
might itself be an appendix to TRIPs. 
*Because arbitration is likely to become increasingly important in 
intellectual property matters, signatories to this Convention must also be 
members of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereafter the New York 
Convention). 
*Subject matter covered: registered and nonregistered intellectual 
property rights, including: [patent,] copyright and neighboring rights, 
trademark, and other intellectual property rights covered by TRIPs and its 
successor agreements, as well as rights of communication to the public 
right in sound recordings [and unfair competition claims]. 
 
 9. See generally Kurt Siehr, Revolution and Evolution in Conflicts Law, 60 LA. L. REV. 1353 
(2000). 
 10. Draft documents on this project are available through the American Law Institute’s website, at 
http://www.ali.org/. 
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Initial Comment on Coverage 
This is a proposed Convention on jurisdiction and recognition of 
judgments in intellectual property cases.  The digital networked 
environment is increasingly making multiterritorial simultaneous 
communication of works of authorship, trade symbols, and other 
intellectual property, a common phenomenon.  The likelihood of 
multiterritorial infringements increases accordingly.  In this environment, 
the practical importance of adjudicating a multiterritorial claim in a single 
forum should be readily apparent.  Indeed, without consolidation of claims 
and recognition of judgments, effective enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, and by the same token, effective defenses to those claims, 
may be illusory for all but the most wealthy litigants. 
The following text is based in part on the work of the Hague 
Conference Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments In 
Civil and Commercial Matters, particularly its Oct. 30, 1999 text, and on 
the work of the American Law Institute International Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Project.  Although these proposed instruments include general 
provisions regarding adjudication of tort and contract claims, and although 
unauthorized use of intellectual property comes within their scope (as 
either the tort of infringement or as breach of a contract), intellectual 
property litigation presents special problems.  For example, localizing torts 
involving intangible rights can be difficult, especially when the activity 
involves digital works transmitted through the Internet; mass-market 
licenses may pose problems different from those encountered in consumer 
contracts generally.  Moreover, some of the rules proposed in these other 
instruments, particularly those regarding consolidation of claims, and 
multiple defendants, are not always well-tailored to intellectual property 
disputes.  This Convention deals with these special problems by building 
on the work of both the Hague Conference and the ALI. 
CHAPTER I - SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION 
Article 1  Substantive Scope  
1. The Convention applies to copyright, neighboring rights, [patents,] 
trademarks, other intellectual property rights, and rights against unfair 
competition, as covered by the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property, and its successor Agreements.  In addition, this 
Convention applies to rights over communication to the public of Sound 
Recordings and to claims involving domain names. 
2. A dispute is not excluded from the scope of the Convention by the 
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mere fact that a government, a governmental agency or any other person 
acting for the State is a party thereto. 
3. Nothing in this Convention affects the privileges and immunities of 
sovereign States or of entities of sovereign States, or of international 
organizations. 
4. This Convention does not apply to: 
 a. Cases in which intellectual property claims are an incidental 
matter, and 
 b. Enforcement of arbitral awards that are subject to the New York 
Convention. 
Article 2  Territorial Scope  
1. A State is eligible to become a Contracting State if it is a member of 
the World Trade Organization, and has become obligated to fully 
implement the TRIPs Agreement, and is also a member of the New York 
Convention. 
2. The provisions of Chapter II shall apply in the courts of a 
Contracting State unless all the parties are habitually resident in that State. 
However, even if all the parties are habitually resident in that State - 
 a. Article 4 shall apply if they have agreed that a court or courts of 
another Contracting State have jurisdiction to determine the dispute; 
 b. [Article 8, regarding exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory 
judgment actions concerning patent validity, shall apply;] 
 c. Articles 12 and 14 shall apply where the court is required to 
determine whether to decline jurisdiction or suspend its proceedings on the 
grounds that the dispute ought to be determined in the courts of another 
Contracting State. 
3. The provisions of Chapter III apply to the recognition and 
enforcement in a Contracting State of a judgment rendered in another 
Contracting State. 
  
CHAPTER II - JURISDICTION 
Article 3  Defendant’s Forum 
1. Subject to the provisions of the Convention, a defendant may be 
sued in the courts of the State where that defendant is habitually resident. 
2. For the purposes of the Convention, an entity or person other than a 
natural person shall be considered to be habitually resident in the State - 
 a. where it has its statutory seat, 
 b. under whose law it was incorporated or formed, 
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 c. where it has its central administration, or 
 d. where it has its principal place of business. 
Article 4  Agreements Pertaining to Choice of Court 
1. If the parties have agreed that a court or courts of a Contracting 
State shall have jurisdiction to settle any dispute which has arisen or may 
arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those 
courts shall have jurisdiction, and its jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless 
the parties have agreed otherwise. Where an agreement having exclusive 
effect designates a court or courts of a non-Contracting State, the courts in 
Contracting States shall decline jurisdiction or suspend proceedings unless 
the court or courts chosen have themselves declined jurisdiction. 
2. An agreement within the meaning of paragraph 1 shall be valid as 
to form, if it was entered into or confirmed - 
 a. in writing; 
 b. by any other means of communication which renders information 
accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference; 
 c. in accordance with practices established between the parties; 
 d. in accordance with a usage of which the parties were or ought to 
have been aware and which is regularly observed by parties to contracts of 
the same nature in the particular trade or commerce concerned. 
3. In nonnegotiated contracts, an agreement within the meaning of 
paragraph 1 shall be valid if the designated Contracting State or forum is 
reasonable in light of - 
 a. the location of the non-contract-drafting party, 
 b. the availability of online dispute resolution or other forms of 
virtual representation, 
 c. the resources of the parties; in particular, of the non-contract-
drafting party, 
 d. the sophistication of the parties; in particular, of the non-contract-
drafting party, 
  e. the substantiality of the connection between the designated forum, 
and the parties or the substance of the dispute, including whether the 
designated forum would have had jurisdiction over the non-drafting party 
in the absence of a forum-selection clause 
 f.  for registered rights, whether the designated forum was 
established by the State to foster expertise in adjudicating disputes of this 
type. 
 g. whether the terms of the agreement were sufficiently apparent 
with respect to accessibility, typographic readability, and national language 
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so as not to cause surprise. 
Article 5  Appearance by the Defendant 
1. [Subject to Article 8,] a court has jurisdiction if the defendant 
proceeds on the merits without contesting jurisdiction. 
2. The defendant has the right to contest jurisdiction no later than at 
the time of the first defense on the merits. 
3. If defendant does not appear, the court may enter judgment.  
However, if local rules so permit, it must satisfy itself that the plaintiff’s 
assertions of the bases of jurisdiction are well-founded. 
Article 6  Infringement Actions  
1. A plaintiff may bring an infringement action in the courts of – 
 a. any State where defendant substantially acted (including 
preparatory acts) in furtherance of the alleged infringement, or 
 b. any State to which the alleged infringement was intentionally 
directed, including those States for which defendant took no reasonable 
steps to avoid acting in or directing activity to that State, or 
 c. any State in which the alleged infringement  foreseeably occurred 
unless the defendant took reasonable steps to avoid acting in or directing 
activity to that State. 
2. If an action is brought in the courts of a State only on the basis of 
the intentional direction of the alleged infringement to that State, then those 
courts shall have jurisdiction only in respect of the injury arising out of 
unauthorized use occurring in that State, unless the injured person has his 
habitual residence or principal place of business in that State. 
3. If an action is brought in the courts of a State only on the basis of 
the occurrence of the infringement in that State, then those courts shall 
have jurisdiction only in respect of the injury arising out of unauthorized 
use occurring in that State. 
4. Notwithstanding arts. 6.1(b) and (c),  and 6.2, an Internet service 
provider shall not be subject to jurisdiction on the basis of claims arising 
out of activity occurring outside the forum State, if the activity is solely 
related to the provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing connections for 
material through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the 
service provider, or if the activity solely concerns the intermediate and 
transient storage of that material in the course of such transmitting, routing, 
or providing connections, if: 
 a. The transmission of the material was initiated by or at the 
direction of a person other than the access provider; 
 b. The transmission routing, provision of connections, or storage is 
carried out through an automatic technical process without sele ction of the 
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material by the service provider; 
 c. The service provider does not select the recipients of the material 
except as an automatic response to the request of another person; 
 d. No copy of the material made by the service provider in the 
course of such intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system 
or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than 
anticipated recipients, and no such copy is maintained on the system or 
network in a manner ordinarily accessible to such antic ipated recipients for 
a longer period than is reasonably necessary for he transmission, routing, or 
provision of connections; and 
 e. The material is transmitted through the system or network without 
modification of its content. 
Article 7  Agreements Pertaining to Intellectual Property Rights  
1. An action to enforce an agreement pertaining to intellectual 
property may be brought in any country whose rights are covered by the 
agreement. 
2. In nonnegotiated contracts, the court should also consider the 
factors listed in Article 4.3. 
Article 8  Declaratory Judgments  
1. Actions for a declaration of rights may be brought on the same 
terms as an action seeking substantive relief. 
2. [However, in proceedings which have as their object the obtaining 
of a declaration of the invalidity or nullity of a registration of patents, the 
courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or registration has been 
applied for, has taken place, or, under the terms of an international 
convention, is deemed to have taken place, have exclusive jurisdiction.  
The issue of invalidity of a patent granted under the laws of another 
country may be adjudicated in an infringement action brought pursuant to 
the rules of this Convention.] 
Article 9  Counterclaims and Supplemental Claims  
1. A court that has jurisdiction to determine a claim under the 
provisions of the Convention also has jurisdiction to determine all claims 
between the parties arising out of the transaction or series of transactions or 
occurrence on which the original claim is based, irrespective of the 
territorial source of the rights at issue, and irrespective of which party 
asserts them. 
2. A court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a supplemental 
claim unrelated to intellectual property rights if it substantially 
predominates over the claims properly within the scope of the Convention. 
Article 10  Multiple Defendants 
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1. A plaintiff bringing an action against a defendant in a court of the 
State in which that defendant is habitually resident may also proceed in that 
court against other defendants not habitually resident in that State if — 
 a. the claims against the defendant habitually resident in that State 
and the other defendants are so closely  connected that they should be 
adjudicated together to avoid a risk of inconsistent judgments, and 
 b. as to each defendant not habitually resident in that State, there is a 
substantial connection between that State’s intellectual property rights and 
the dispute involving that defendant, or 
 c. as between the States in which the other defendants are habitually 
resident, and the forum, the forum is the most closely related to the entire 
dispute, and there is no other forum in which the entire dispute could be 
adjudicated. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to a codefendant invoking an exclusive 
choice of court clause agreed with the plaintiff and conforming with Article 
4. 
Article 11  Third Party Claims  
1. A court that has jurisdiction to determine a claim under the 
provisions of the Convention shall also have jurisdiction to determine a 
claim by a defendant against a third party for indemnity or contribution in 
respect of the claim against that defendant to the extent that such an action 
is permitted by national law, provided that there is a substantial connection 
between that State’s intellectual property rights and the dispute involving 
that third party. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to a third party invoking an exclusive 
choice of court clause agreed with the defendant and conforming with 
Article 4. 
Article 12  Lis Pendens  
1. Subject to Article 13 and provided that the court second seized does 
not have exclusive jurisdiction under Article 4, when the same parties are 
engaged in proceedings in courts of different Contracting States, the court 
second seized shall suspend the proceedings if the court first seized has 
jurisdiction and is expected to render a judgment capable of being 
recognized under the Convention in the State of the court second seized, 
irrespective of the relief sought, when: 
 a. the claims arise from a single territory’s intellectual property 
rights, or 
 b. the claims arise out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions or occurrence. 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if the court second seized has exclusive 
 2002] Draft Convention 115 
jurisdiction under Article 4. 
3. The court second seized shall decline jurisdiction as soon as it is 
presented with a judgment rendered by the court first seized that complies 
with the requirements for recognition or enforcement under the 
Convention. 
4. Upon application of a party, the court second seized may proceed 
with the case if the plaintiff in the court first seized has failed to take the 
necessary steps to bring the proceedings to a decision on the merits or if 
that court has not rendered such a decision within a reasonable time. 
5. If in the action before the court first seized, the plaintiff seeks a 
determination that it has no obligation to the defendant, and if an action 
seeking substantive relief is brought in the court second seized 
 a. the provisions of paragraphs 1–4 above shall not apply to the 
court second seized, unless the declaratory judgment plaintiff has advanced 
its claim as part of an action initiated before the court first seized by the 
declaratory judgment defendant, and 
 b. the court first seized shall suspend the proceedings at the request 
of a party if the court second seized is expected to render a decision 
capable of being recognized under the Convention. 
6. The provisions of the preceding paragraphs apply to the court 
second seized even in a case where the jurisdiction of that court is based on 
the national law of that State in accordance with Article 15. 
7. For the purpose of this Article, a court shall be deemed to be seized- 
 a. at the time when the document instituting the proceedings or an 
equivalent document is lodged with the court, provided that the plaintiff 
has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have 
service effected on the defendant, or 
 b. if the document has to be served before being lodged with the 
court, at the time when it is received by the authority responsible for 
service, provided that the plaintiff has not subsequently failed to take the 
steps he was required to take to have the document lodged with the court. 
Article 13  Consolidation of Territorial Claims  
1. Upon the motion of a party, or sua sponte, the court first seized 
should consider the advantages of worldwide resolution of the dispute 
among the parties through consolidation of related pending actions, and 
through inviting the parties to assert all intellectual property claims related 
to the action in a single forum. 
2. For the purposes of this Article, actions are deemed to be related 
where, irrespective of the territorial source of the rights and the relief 
sought, the claims arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions 
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or occurrence. 
3. In deciding whether and how to consolidate the action, the court 
should consult with the parties and with other courts in which related 
actions are pending, and together they should consider: 
 a. in general, whether consolidating would promote efficiency and 
conserve judicial resources and the resources of the parties, including 
whether the difficulty of managing the litigation outweighs the benefits of 
consolidation; 
 b. whether or not inconsistent judgments could result if multiple 
courts adjudicated the related claims. 
4. The issue of consolidation must be raised no later than at the time of 
the first defense on the merits. 
5. If there is no consolidation of related actions, the judgment in one 
action shall not be preclusive of the other. 
Article 14  Exceptional Circumstances for Declining Jurisdiction 
1. In exceptional circumstances, when the jurisdiction of the court 
seized is not founded on an exclusive choice of court agreement valid 
under Article 4, [or on Article 8]  the court may, on application by a party, 
suspend its proceedings if in that case a court of another State has 
jurisdiction and is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute. Such 
application must be made no later than at the time of the first defense on 
the merits. 
2. The court shall take into account, in particular - 
 a. any inconvenience to the parties in view of their habitual 
residence; 
 b. the nature and location of the evidence, including documents and 
witnesses, and the procedures for obtaining such evidence; 
 c. applicable limitation or prescription periods; 
 d. the possibility of obtaining recognition and enforcement of any 
decision on the merits; 
 e. whether the Contracting State in which the court seized is located 
has the most significant relationship to the parties or the claims; 
 f. [in patent cases, the expertise of the judicial system of the 
Contracting State in which the court seized is located.] 
3. In cases involving consolidation, the court should also consider  
 a. whether the court first seized has jurisdiction over as many parties 
as another court, including courts in which related claims are pending, 
unless the economic center of gravity of the case is in the court first seized; 
 b. whether the court has, relative to another court, including courts 
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seized with related causes of action, the subject matter authority to 
adjudicate all of the territorial rights put into issue, unless the economic 
center of gravity of the case is in the court first seized; 
 c. in disputes over contract rights, whether the court has the most 
significant relationship to the contract.  In particular, the court should take 
into account: 
 (1) the residence of the parties; 
 (2) the country in which the intellectual property was developed; 
 (3) the country in which the principal obligation under the contract 
is to be performed. 
4. In deciding whether to suspend the proceedings, a court shall not 
discriminate on the basis of the nationality or habitual residence of the 
parties. 
5. A court shall not dismiss or suspend the proceedings on the sole 
ground that the case raises questions of foreign law. 
6. If the court decides to suspend its proceedings under paragraph 1, it 
may order the defendant to provide security suffic ient to satisfy any 
decision of the other court on the merits. However, it shall make such an 
order if the other court has jurisdiction only under Article 15,  unless the 
defendant establishes that sufficient assets exist in the State of that other 
court or in another State where the court’s decision could be enforced. 
7. When the court has suspended its proceedings under paragraph 1, 
 a. it shall decline to exercise jurisdiction if the court of the other 
State exercises jurisdiction, or if the plaintiff does not bring the 
proceedings in that State within the time specified by the court, or 
 b. it shall proceed with the case if the court of the other State 
decides not to exercise jurisdiction. 
Article 15  Jurisdiction Based on National Law 
Subject  to Articles 4, 5, [8,] and 19, the Convention does not prevent 
the application by Contracting States of rules of jurisdiction under national 
law, provided that this is not prohibited under Article 16. 
Article 16  Prohibited Grounds of Jurisdiction 
1. Jurisdiction shall not be exercised by the courts of a Contracting 
State on the basis solely of any of the following: 
 a. the presence or the seizure in that State of tangible property 
belonging to the defendant, except where the dispute is directly related to 
that property; 
 b. the presence or the seizure in that State of intellectual property 
belonging to the defendant, except where the dispute is directly related to 
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that intellectual property; 
 c. the nationality of the plaintiff; 
 d. the nationality of the defendant; 
 e. the domicile, habitual or temporary residence, or presence of the 
plaintiff in that State; 
 f.  the carrying on of commercial or other activities by the defendant 
in that State, except where the dispute is directly related to those activities; 
 g. the service of a writ upon the defendant in that State; 
 h. the temporary residence or presence of the defendant in that State; 
 i. the signing in that State of the contract from which the dispute 
arises. 
Article 17  Authority of the Court Seized 
Where the defendant does not enter an appearance, the court shall 
verify whether Article 16 prohibits it from exercising jurisdiction if - 
a. national law so requires; or 
b. the plaintiff so requests. 
Article 18  Verification of Notice  
1. The court shall stay the proceedings so long as it is not established 
that the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent 
document, including the essential elements of the claim, was notified to the 
defendant in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable the defendant to 
arrange for a defense, or that all necessary steps have been taken to that 
effect, under the law of the State of the court first seized. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not affect the use of international instruments 
concerning the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in 
civil or commercial matters, in accordance with the law of the forum. 
3. Paragraph 1 shall not apply, in case of urgency, to any provisional 
or protective measures. 
Article 19  Provisional and Protective Measures 
1. The court where the action is properly pending under the rules of 
this Convention has jurisdiction to determine the merits of the case has 
jurisdiction to order any provisional or protective measures, including 
trans-border injunctions. 
2. The courts of a State in which intellectual or tangible property is 
located have jurisdiction to order any provisional or protective measures in 
respect of that property. 
3. Courts in other Contracting States not having jurisdiction under 
paragraphs 1 or 2 may order provisional or protective measures, provided 
that - 
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 a. their enforcement is limited to the territory of that State; and 
 b. their purpose is to protect on an interim basis a claim on the 
merits which is pending or to be brought by the requesting party. 
CHAPTER III - RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Article 20  Definition of “Judgment” 
For the purposes of this Chapter, “judgment” means - 
a. any decision given by a court, whatever it may be called, including 
a decree or order, as well as the determination of costs or expenses by an 
officer of the court, provided that it relates to a decision which may be 
recognised or enforced under the Convention; 
b. decisions ordering provisional or protective measures in accordance 
with Article 19, paragraph 1. 
Article 21  Verification of Jurisdiction 
1. Except in cases where the defendant has waived a challenge to 
jurisdiction by joining issue on the merits of the case in accordance with 
Article 5.2, the court addressed shall verify the jurisdiction of the court of 
origin.  In cases where objections to jurisdiction are waived through 
appearance, the court addressed shall verify that issue was joined without 
contesting jurisdiction. 
2. In verifying the jurisdiction of the court of origin, the findings of 
fact on which the court of origin based its jurisdiction shall be presumed 
correct.  However, this presumption does not apply if the judgment was 
given by default. 
3. In verifying the jurisdiction of the court of origin when that court 
has rendered a default judgment, the court addressed must satisfy itself that 
the plaintiff’s assertions of the bases of jurisdiction under this Convention 
and under the law of the State of the court of origin were well-founded. 
4. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may not be refused on 
the ground that the court addressed considers that the court of origin should 
have declined jurisdiction in accordance with Article 14. 
Article 22  Judgments Excluded from Chapter III 
This Chapter shall not apply to judgments based on a ground of 
jurisdiction provided for by national law in accordance with Article 15. 
Article 23  Judgments to be Recognized or Enforced 
1. A judgment that is within a basis of jurisdiction provided for in this 
Convention shall be recognized or enforced under this Chapter. 
 a. In order for its judgment to be recognized and enforced under this 
Convention, the rendering court must declare that its judgment comes 
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within the scope of the Convention. A party may at any point in the 
proceedings request the court to so declare. 
 b. In order to be recognized, a judgment referred to in paragraph 1 
must be recognized in the State of origin. 
 c. In order to be enforceable, a judgment referred to in paragraph 1 
must be enforceable in the State of origin. 
 d. However, recognit ion or enforcement may be postponed if the 
judgment is the subject of review in the State of origin or if the time limit 
for seeking a review has not expired. 
 e. The preclusive effect of a judgment shall be no greater than its 
effect in the State of origin. 
Article 24  Judgments Not to be Recognized or Enforced 
A judgment based on a ground of jurisdiction which conflicts with 
Articles 4, 5, 7, [or 8,] or whose application is prohibited by virtue of 
Article 16, shall not be recognized or enforced. 
Article 25  Grounds for Refusal of Recognition or Enforcement 
1. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if - 
 a. proceedings between the same parties and having the same 
subject matter are pending before a court of the State addressed, if first 
seized in accordance with Article 12 or if consolidated in accordance with 
Article 13; 
 b. the judgment is inconsistent with the judgment of the court first 
seized, or if the actions were consolidated in accordance with Article 13, 
the judgment is inconsistent with the judgment of the court of 
consolidation; 
 c. the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent 
document, including the essential elements of the claim, was not notified to 
the defendant in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable the 
defendant to arrange for a defense; 
 d. the rendering court’s jurisdiction was based on a nonnegotiated 
contract whose forum designation was unreasonable under Article 4.3; 
 e. the judgment results from proceedings incompatible with 
fundamental principles of procedure of the State addressed, including the 
right of each party to be heard by an impartial and independent court; 
 f.  the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of 
procedure; 
 g. recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible 
with the public policy of the State addressed; 
 h. where the rendering court’s choice of law was arbitrary or 
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unreasonable, for example, where it applied a law lacking sufficient 
significant relationship to the dispute.  The conformity of the forum to the 
jurisdictional terms of this Convention does not necessarily, of itself, 
suffice to establish a significant relationship between its laws and the 
dispute. 
2. Without prejudice to such review as is necessary for the purpose of 
application of the provisions of this Chapter, there shall be no review of the 
merits of the judgment rendered by the court of origin. 
Article 26  Documents to be Produced 
1. The party seeking recognition or applying for enforcement shall 
produce - 
 a. a complete and certified copy of the judgment; 
 b. if the judgment was rendered by default, the original or a certified 
copy of a document establishing that the document which instituted the 
proceedings or an equivalent document was notified to the defaulting party; 
 c. all documents required to establish that the judgment is 
enforceable in the State of origin; 
 d. if the court addressed so requires, a translation of the documents 
referred to above, made by a person qualified to do so. 
2. No legalization or similar formality may be required. 
3. If the terms of the judgment do not permit the court addressed to 
verify whether the conditions of this Chapter have been complied with, that 
court may require the production of any other necessary documents. 
Article 27  Procedure  
The procedure for recognition, declaration of enforceability or 
registration for enforcement, and the enforcement of the judgment, are 
governed by the law of the State addressed so far as the Convention does 
not provide otherwise. The court addressed shall act expeditiously. 
Article 28  Costs of Proceedings  
No security, bond, or deposit, however described, to guarantee the 
payment of costs or expenses shall be required by reason only that the 
applicant is a national of, or has its habitual residence in, another 
Contracting State. 
Article 29  Legal Aid 
Natural persons habitually resident in a Contracting State shall be 
entitled, in proceedings for recognition or enforcement, to legal aid under 
the same conditions as apply to persons habitually resident in the requested 
State. 
Article 30  Damages 
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1. In so far as a judgment awards noncompensatory, including 
exemplary or punitive, damages, it shall be recognized at least to the extent 
that similar or comparable damages could have been awarded in the State 
addressed.  This rule does not apply to damages that are intended to 
compensate the plaintiff but without requiring proof of actual damages. 
 a. Where the debtor, after proceedings in which the creditor has the 
opportunity to be heard, satisfies the court addressed that in the 
circumstances, including those existing in the State of origin, grossly 
excessive damages have been awarded, recognition may be limited to a 
lesser amount. 
 b. In no event shall the court addressed recognize the judgment in an 
amount less than that which could have been awarded in the State 
addressed in the same circumstances, including those existing in the State 
of origin. 
3. In applying paragraphs 1 and 2, the court addressed shall take into 
account whether and to what extent the damages awarded by the court of 
origin serve to cover costs and expenses relating to the proceedings, not 
otherwise covered by statutory provisions relating to the awards of 
attorneys fees. 
Article 31  Injunctions  
1. In the ordinary course, injunctive relief is available; nonetheless 
courts may decline to enjoin activities within their territories if: 
 a. health and safety are at issue, or 
 b. the judgment conflicts with fundamental cultural policies in the 
State where enforcement is sought, and 
 c. damages would afford an effective remedy for that territory. 
2. In no event must a State recognize an award of injunctive relief if 
such would not be required under the TRIPs Agreement, unless the State 
addressed would have awarded injunctive relief under the same 
circumstances.  Should the rendering court decline to enter injunctive relief 
pursuant to this subsection, it must award compensatory damages. 
Article 32  Severability 
If the judgment contains elements which are severable, one or more of 
them may be separately recognized, declared enforceable, registered for 
enforcement, or enforced. 
Article 33  Authentic Instruments 
1. Each Contracting State may declare that it will enforce, subject to 
reciprocity, authentic instruments formally drawn up or registered and 
enforceable in another Contracting State. 
2. The authentic instrument must have been authenticated by a public 
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authority or a delegate of a public authority and the authentication must 
relate to both the signature and the content of the document. 
Article 34  Settlements  
Settlements to which a court has given its authority shall be 
recognized, declared enforceable or registered for enforcement in the State 
addressed under the same conditions as judgments falling within the 
Convention, so far as those conditions apply to settlements. 
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COMMENTARY 
Among other things, this commentary addresses provisions that tailor 
the 1999 Draft of the Hague Convention to intellectual property disputes.  
To the extent the Convention adopts language from the 1999 Hague 
proposal, the applicable Commentary on those provisions is that of 
Professor Catherine Kessedjian,11 and of Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar.12 
Arts. 1 and 2: Substantive and Territorial Scope 
In its substantive and territorial limitations, this Convention differs 
radically from the 1999 Draft Hague Convention.  It does so for reasons set 
out below.  These limitations raise new problems, also discussed below. 
 (a) TRIPs Limitation. 
With a few possible exceptions the Convention is limited to disputes 
over rights covered by the TRIPs Agreement.  Furthermore, it is open to 
signature only by countries that have joined the WTO and are obligated to 
fully implement the TRIPs Agreement.  There are two reasons for these 
limitations.  First, a recurring fear expressed in connection with the draft 
Hague Convention is that litigants will engage in forum shopping and use 
the courts of certain states to disrupt the balance that other nations have 
struck between intellectual property users and owners.  Limiting the 
Convention to TRIPs rights (with the exceptions and additions discussed 
below) and to TRIPs implementers means that all litigation will be 
conducted in States that have agreed to enforce the laws that will be at 
issue, that are amenable to dispute resolution proceedings if they fail to 
fulfill their obligations fairly and adequately, and that have agreed to assure 
transparent and efficient judicial process.  Second, although dispute 
resolution under the WTO cannot provide litigants with a substitute for a 
centralized and authoritative appellate body (such as the US Supreme Court 
or the European Court of Justice), it can provide institutional mechanisms 
(such as dispute resolution panels, the Dispute Settlement Board, and the 
Council for TRIPs) for examining and revising the law as it develops in 
litigation under the Convention.  These limitations do, however, raise two 
 
 11. Catherine Kessedjian, Preliminary Document Nos. 7–10 & 12, at the website of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, http://www.hcch.net /e/workprog/jdgm.html. 
 12. Peter Nygh & Fausto Pocar, Report of the Special Commission on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, at the website of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, http://www.hcch.net /e/workprog/jdgm.html (last visited June 1, 2002) [herinafter 
Nygh & Pocar Report ]. 
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important problems. 
 (1) Line drawing.  One concern with narrowing the scope of the 
Convention in this way is that it will require difficult line drawing and lead 
to satellite litigation over the question whether a judgment is sufficiently 
related to TRIPs rights to qualify for enforcement.  There are several 
responses.  Most important, the TRIPs Agreement is itself quite broad: 
while it most prominently covers patent, copyright, and trademark rights, it 
explicitly also applies to geographic indications, industrial designs, layout 
designs, and undisclosed information (trade secrets).13  Thus, the vast 
majority of commercially significant intellectual property cases will be 
covered.  Second, as noted below, other claims–such as claims sounding in 
unfair competition–can be joined with covered claims under the court’s 
supplemental authority, see Art. 9.  Third, art. 2.1 of the TRIPs Agreement 
obligates members to comply with arts. 1–12 of the Paris Convention.14  
Art.10bis of the Paris Convention covers unfair competition, which is 
defined quite broadly.15  Thus, the claims most typically considered part of 
intellectual property law–claims for passing off, disputes over unregistered 
trademarks and trade dress, claims akin to dilution, false association, and 
misrepresentation, claims for trade secret violations and breaches of 
confidential relationships, and claims of misappropriation–are all directly 
within the scope of this Convention.   
It is nonetheless possible that there will be situations where 
intellectual property claims are embedded in other disputes.  For example, a 
 
 13. TRIPs Agreement, supra  note 2, arts. 22, 25, 35, 39. 
 14. See Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act 
of 1998, AB-2001-7, WT/DS176/AB/R, pt. XI, ¶ 336 (Jan. 2, 2002) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report 
in the Havana Club case] (holding that the language of art. 2.1 of the TRIPs Agreement incorporates 
art. 8 of the Paris Convention) available at http://docsonline.wto.org. 
 15. Article 10bis indicates that unfair competition comprises “competition contrary to honest 
pratices in industrial or commercial matters.”  Paris Convention, supra note 6, art. 10bis(2).  
Additionally, art. 10bis(3) gives the following specific examples:  
1. all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means whatever with the 
establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor; 
2. false allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to discredit the establishment, the 
goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor; 
3. indications or allegations the use of which in the course of trade is liable to mislead the 
public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for their 
purpose, or the quantity, of the goods. 
Furthermore, “honest practices” takes into account not only the practices existing in the country 
where protection is sought, but also practices “established in international trade.”  G.H.C. 
BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY  144 (1968); see also TRIPs Agreement, supra  note 2, art. 39 (referring to 
art.10bis of the Paris Convention). 
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case involving the sale of the assets of a corporation may raise questions 
about the value of intellectual property assets.  Antitrust cases sometimes 
also involve claims of patent misuse or invalidity.  Employment disputes 
can include claims about who owns rights to information developed in the 
course of employment.  Determining which of these cases are within the 
scope of the Convention will not always be easy.  However, it is important 
to recognize that this problem is not uncommon in any litigation system in 
which there are courts of specialized subject matter jurisdiction.  Thus, it is 
not insuperable.  Indeed, ways to solve it have developed.16 
In the US system, for example, there is substantial jurisprudence on 
choosing the cases that can be heard in a federal (as opposed to a state) 
forum and also law on when an appeal from a court of general jurisdiction 
is sufficiently patent-related to be heard by the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit.  In general, the allocation of jurisdiction turns on whether 
the case “arises under” federal (or patent) law.17  In American Well Works 
Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., Justice O.W. Holmes interpreted this language 
as meaning that “[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of 
action.”18  However, subsequent courts have regarded that test as overly 
inclusive.  In the intellectual property context, the formulation most often 
cited is that of Judge Henry Friendly in T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu: 
Mindful of the hazards of formulation in this treacherous area, we 
think that an action “arises under” the Copyright Act if and only if the 
complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act, e.g., a suit for 
infringement or for the statutory royalties for record reproduction, 17 
U.S.C. § 101, cf. Joy Music, Inc. v. Seeco Records, Inc., 166 F.Supp. 549 
(S.D.N.Y.1958), or asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act, as 
in De Sylva [v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956)], or, at the very least and 
perhaps more doubtfully, presents a case where a distinctive policy of 
the Act requires that federal principles control the disposition of the 
claim.19 
As a result of this narrowed conception of “arising under,” the claims 
in T.B. Harms–which concerned ownership of copyrights–were not 
considered within the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts.  (It is 
important to note that the Copyright Act in effect at that time did not 
provide comprehensive treatment of ownership issues). 
In addition, the “well-pleaded complaint rule” is used to determine 
 
 16. In Europe, these methods are currently evolving.  See, e.g., Peter von Rospatt, Part Two: 
Decisions of German Courts in Patent Infringement Cases with Cross-Border Effect, 29 IIC 504, 506 
(1998). 
 17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295, 1331, 1338 (2001). 
 18. 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). 
 19. 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965). 
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whether a complaint may be heard in a US federal court.20  Under this rule, 
counterclaims, cross claims, issues arising in defenses, as well as issues 
mentioned by the plaintiff  but not legally required as part of the complaint, 
are ignored for determining a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 
This is not the approach adopted here.  Within specific jurisdictional 
systems, courts with special subject matter authority tend to work best 
when they are small enough for judges to stay in close contact and abreast 
of one another’s decisions.  Constraints like those found in US federal law 
further that goal by limiting dockets while preserving enough cases to give 
each court sufficient power to influence the development of the law within 
its authority.  But docket-restraint is not an issue here.  Indeed, the opposite 
is the case: since consolidation and enforcement of foreign judgments save 
judicial resources, the scope of the Convention should be broad. 
For US federal trial courts, the well-pleaded complaint rule also 
performs another function: it allows the allocation issue to be decided at the 
earliest stage of the pleadings, before significant development and resource 
expenditures have occurred.  Again, this is not a concern here because the 
parties will presumably want at least part of the case adjudicated in the 
chosen forum, no matter what the international ramifications of the 
judgment.  Thus, there is no need to limit coverage to the first claims that 
the plaintiff raises.  So long as a case mainly resolves intellectual property 
issues, it should fall within the Convention, no matter who raised the claim 
and when in the initial stages it was raised.21NOTE: SENTENCE 
DELETED HERE; footnote altered. 
But even if the specific formulas proposed by Judge Friendly or 
Justice Holmes are not apposite, the general approach they took is.  Thus, 
both essentially looked for an allocation rule that reflects the rationale for 
drawing lines in the first instance.  Friendly, for example, alluded to “a 
distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal princ iples control.”22  In 
this Convention, the concern is to make sure that the courts where litigation 
takes place are committed to fair adjudication of intellectual property 
 
 20. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
 21. In The Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., - US -;  2002 WL 1155866 
(June 3, 2002), the Court declined to interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1295, which controls the appellate 
jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to permit appeal of a patent 
counterclaim to that court, even though that tribunal was established to centralize patent appeals.  
However, the Supreme Court’s reasoning is not inconsistent with our approach. The majority posited 
that a purpose of the well-pleaded complaint rule is to give the plaintiff mastery over the location of the 
appeal; allowing a counterclaim to control the location of appeal would defeat that purpose.  In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Stevens suggested that directing some patent appeals to other courts would 
provide an antidote to the institutional bias that may develop in specialized tribunals.    
 22. T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828. 
 128 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 77:3  
disputes.  The notion, in short, is to confine adjudication  to courts whose 
records are subject to examination by the WTO for bias or partiality.  
Accordingly, the determination of what is within the scope of the 
Convention should turn on whether the WTO nexus is of paramount 
concern to the parties, and whether the outcome of the case would be of 
evidentiary value in WTO dispute resolution.  Under such an approach, a 
case that is primarily about the sale of a business, or constraints on 
competition, or termination of employment, are not within the 
Convention’s scope.23 
Disputes involving ownership of covered intellectual property 
rights present a more difficult issue.  The proposal for a European Patent 
Court excludes from jurisdiction claims of ownership and the import of the 
T.B.Harms case was similarly, to exclude ownership claims from the scope 
of federal jurisdiction.  Moreover, as the recent Appellate Body Report 
relative to the Havana Club case notes, ownership is not directly covered 
by the TRIPs Agreement.24  Nonetheless, the efficiency and consistency 
goals that animate this proposed Convention argue for including ownership 
disputes within its scope.  Some issues of ownership would be included in 
any event: those that are based directly on intellectual property law 
provisions,25 and those that arise in the context of infringement actions.26  
In addition, the same Appellate Body Report found that the US had an 
obligation under art. 42 of the TRIPs Agreement to permit the assertion of 
ownership claims under domestic law.27  Since the WTO dispute resolution 
framework thus provides assurance of fair and transparent process, 
ownership issues, even when presented alone, should be considered within 
the scope of the Convention. 
Presumably, there will often be a point in the litigation when the 
parties will need to know whether their case will terminate in a judgment 
entitled to enforcement in all member States.  They may only need to learn 
this at the end, or they may need to think about it at the stage where global 
claims might be consolidated, or issues of forum selection arise.  Because 
there will be marginal cases where the decision will be difficult (especially 
in the years before a jurisprudence on the question has developed), Art. 
 
 23. Cf. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent, art. 46, 2000 
O.J. (C 337) E/278 (stating that employer-employee relatio nships will fall under the jurisdiction of 
national courts, not the European Patent Court). 
 24. Appellate Body Report in the Havana Club case, supra  note 14, ¶¶ 139–148. 
 25. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
 26. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 
1998); Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
 27. Appellate Body Report in the Havana Club case, supra  note 14, ¶ 218. 
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23.1(a) authorizes the court hearing the case to decide whether it comes 
under the Convention’s enforcement provisions, and it gives that court 
leeway to make this certification as soon as the issue becomes important to 
one of the parties.  The certification procedure will not make drawing the 
line easier, but it will give parties full notice of the effects of the judgment 
at the stage at which they are making important strategic choices.  
Allowing that question to come up in the court rendering the judgment has 
the additional benefit of allowing this issue to be decided by the court that 
is best acquainted with the litigation, rather than by a court trying to 
determine the scope of the judgment for enforcement or res judicata 
purposes. 
 (2) Claim splitting.  Another concern is that a Convention pr imarily 
limited to TRIPs claims will lead to bifurcation of cases and thus, the 
expenditure of extra resources, as parties are forced to lit igate, or seek 
enforcement of, the intellectual property portions of their cases in courts 
identified in this instrument, and to deal with other parts of their cases in 
other places.  Perhaps there will be such situations, but the Convention will 
certainly avoid more duplicative litigation than it will cause.  In addition, 
Art. 9 of this Convention permits the assertion of “supplemental” non-
intellectual property issues that arise out of the transaction or series of 
transactions or occurrence on which the original claim is based.  Thus, for 
example, a moral rights claim, which would not come within the express 
terms of the Convention because it is not explicitly mentioned in the TRIPs 
Agreement or incorporated in it,28 could be heard if it arose in a transaction 
or occurrence that also gave rise to a claim within the scope of the 
Convention. 
Here again, line drawing may be difficult and similar experiences in 
national judicial systems may be helpful.  In the US federal system, the 
practice of permitting the assertion of transactionally related claims took 
hold in Hurn v. Oursler,29 where the plaintiff joined to a claim for 
copyright infringement, a claim of unfair competition for unauthorized use 
of the allegedly copyrighted play.  Even though the second claim was based 
on state law, it was adjudicated in federal court, the theory being that these 
claims were “not separate causes of action, but different grounds asserted 
in support of the same cause of action.”30  That idea was expanded in 
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs to cover state and federal claims 
 
 28.  See TRIPs Agreement, supra  note 2, art. 2.1. 
 29. 289 U.S. 238 (1933). 
 30. Id. at 247. 
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that “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.”31 Significantly, the 
practice was justified by “considerations of judicial economy, convenience 
and fairness to litigants”–in other words, by the same concerns that animate 
this Convention. 32 
The Gibbs “common nucleus of operative fact” test was designed to 
define when a case is within the constitutional authority of federal courts.  
Constitutional authority is not a consideration here, however, as the court’s 
subject matter power over the dispute comes strictly from national law.  
The role of Art. 9 is to determine when the judgment is entitled to 
enforcement and for that function, the “transaction or series of transactions 
or occurrence on which the original claim is based” language is easier to 
apply since it is used in other contexts.  Furthermore, it is similar to the 
Brussels Convention’s “arising from the same contract or facts on which 
the original claim was based.”33 
Art. 9 gives courts discretion to dismiss supplemental claims when 
they substantially predominate over intellectual property claims.  This 
procedure is derived from US federal jurisdiction law.34  It prevents a party 
from gaining the benefits of the Convention by characterizing a case as 
within its subject matter scope, even though the case has little connection to 
intellectual property rights.35 
Once again, the unavoidable ambiguity in the terminology is 
ameliorated by having the  court  hearing the case certify whether it comes 
within the Convention at the first stage at which the issue becomes 
important. 
(b) Exceptions. 
There are three exceptions to the general rule that the Convention 
covers TRIPs rights: patents, which are excluded; and rights of 
communication to the public in sound recordings, rights covered only in the 
Paris Convention, and domain names, which are included. 
 (1) Patents.  Patents are explicitly a part of the TRIPs Agreement.  
The initial determination was to include them here, and to do so even 
 
 31. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
 32. Id. at 726; see also Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 255 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that a 
trade secret claim should be considered supplemental to a patent claim to avoid wasting judicial 
resources and the potential for inconsistent outcomes). 
 33. See Brussels Convention, supra  note 7, art. 6(3)  (in both the current versions and the revised 
version). 
 34. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2001). 
 35. But see Breed v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 253 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding—in a 
case that involved thirteen state claims and one claim to correct inventorship on a patent—that any 
question of patent law brings an appeal before the Federal Circuit, no matter how insubstantial the 
patent issue is relative to the rest of the case). 
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though the drafters of the Hague Convention were told that registered 
rights–particularly patent–cases posed special problems.  Initially, these 
peculiarities did not appear insurmountable.  The main objections to 
covering registered rights were first, that registering and maintaining 
registration are “acts of state” and foreign courts should not upset another 
State’s official acts; second, that the social costs of patenting are so high 
(particularly for pharmaceuticals) that some fora might become 
“information havens,” over-eager to invalidate patents on a worldwide 
basis; third, that both validity and infringement issues are too technical to 
be decided by courts of general jurisdiction; and fourth, that differing 
discovery opportunities could lead to important differences in outcome, 
particularly on issues, like priority of invention, that are unique to the law 
of the US, where broad discovery is available. 
The first issue, act of state, is probably a red herring: if a State signs 
onto the Convention, the State is agreeing to permit foreign courts to 
examine its Acts.  The “information haven” concern is, as noted, 
substantially alleviated by restricting the Convention to TRIPs 
implementers.  In addition, limitations on the use of declaratory judgment 
actions (Art. 8), their significance for choice-of-court purposes (Art. 
12.5(a)), and the power given courts through the consolidation provision 
(Art. 13) should reduce concerns about forum manipulation.  The technical 
incompetence issue might be addressed by limiting the consolidation of 
foreign patent actions to those States that have specialized technically 
competent jurisdictions, like the US Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, and similar courts in other jurisdictions (Art. 14). Discovery 
problems could be dealt with by making the prejudicial absence of 
adequate discovery a ground for refusing enforcement and recognition (Art. 
25).  The draft has written brackets references to these alternatives for 
patent actions. 
Further deliberation, however, made it seem unwise to ignore the 
objections of the patent bar.  The patent laws of the TRIPs States represent 
a greater range of substantive differences than do their copyright or 
trademark laws.  As a result, the technical difficulties in these cases would 
be extremely challenging even for judges familiar with local patent law.  
Resources are not saved by making a consolidated case so complex, it can 
be decided only with difficulty and with an increase in the risk of 
inaccuracy.  Further, practitioners note that there are places where validity 
can only be adjudicated in an expert agency.  It would be paradoxical to 
permit foreign courts to entertain cases that could not be heard in the local 
courts of the country where the right in question was registered. The costs 
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of including patents in the Convention are, in other words, very high. 
At the same time, the benefits are low–or, lower than in copyright and 
trademark cases.  Patent rights are more territorially grounded than other 
intellectual property subject matter.  Moreover, patented products continue 
to be distributed mainly by physical means: apart from software and 
business methods, patent infringements seem unlikely to occur by means of 
the Internet.  So long as state-by-state adjudication of rights remains viable, 
and the costs attached to international enforcement appear high, it makes 
little sense to treat patents the same as other  intellectual property rights. 
Some practitioners were also dissatisfied with the concept of making 
patent actions exclusive to the forum where the patent right was registered, 
as per the proposed Hague Convention. 36  Their concern is that this would 
freeze the law and prevent the development of methods for efficient 
adjudication of worldwide patent actions.  Given the need for foreign 
enforcement that will arise in connection with patented products that can be 
distributed on the Internet, simply excluding patents from the scope of the 
Convention seems the wiser course.  Exclusion does not oblige 
consolidation or enforcement, but it does not prevent these practices either. 
 (2) Sound recordings.  The first proposed addition to the scope of 
the Convention is to broaden the scope of protection for sound recordings.  
These are not covered by the Berne Convention as it is incorporated in the 
TRIPs Agreement, and the express provisions of TRIPs extend only to 
reproduction and rental rights.37  At the same time, however, there appears 
to be international consensus that sound recordings should be protected, in 
at least some circumstances, against unauthorized communication to the 
public.38 
It remains to be seen whether the TRIPs Agreement comes to 
incorporate other intellectual property instruments, either directly or 
through recognition of the norms embodied in them.39  However, the values 
represented by the Conventions regarding the scope of protection for sound 
recordings are so close to the principles recognized in the TRIPs 
Agreement, it is difficult to believe that a State that fully abides by its 
TRIPs obligations would not fairly adjudicate communication to the public 
 
 36. See 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 12(4). 
 37. TRIPs Agreement, supra  note 2, art. 14. 
 38. See WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 5; European Parliament & 
Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Information Society, arts. 2(c), 3.2(b), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10; see also the 1995 
and 1998 amendments to the US Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1996 & Supp. 2000). 
 39. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International Norms 
in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001); Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: 
The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on TRIPs Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 441 (1997). 
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claims over sound recordings.  Including disputes regarding copyright and 
neighboring rights in communications to the public of sound recordings 
within the scope of this Convention has the benefit of preventing the 
bifurcation of cases involving claims to both the material on a sound 
recording and the recording itself, or the bifurcation of cases involving 
reproduction and performance rights in sound recordings. 
 (3) Domain names.  Domain names are not yet clearly fully 
protected by the TRIPs Agreement.  However, the cases involving domain 
names are based mainly on laws explicitly governed by the TRIPs 
Agreement (for example, claims of consumer confusion,  
misrepresentation, dilution, or false association), or on laws with similar 
concepts (for example, cyberpiracy laws).  Because of the strong tie 
between TRIPs commitments and the values embodied in domain-name 
law, the WTO nexus is a significant check on the way courts handle these 
suits.  And because these cases have the same efficiency and inconsistency 
problems that arise in international trademark and copyright disputes, it 
was thought that they could usefully be included in this Convention. 
One objection to treating domain names under the Convention is that 
they can be conceptualized as equivalent to titles to land, with the result 
that claims over ownership are truly local actions reserved to the courts of 
the place where the domain name is registered.  The impetus for this 
conceptualization comes from a provision of US cyberpiracy law, which 
permits the owner of a trademark to file an in rem action against a domain 
name in the judicial district “in which the domain name registrar, domain 
name registry, or other domain name authority . . . is located.”40  For 
example, in Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, a Canadian 
trademark holder sued another Canadian over ownership of a domain name 
in the Eastern District of Virginia.41  Apparently, the notion was that the 
domain name was reified at the place of registry, making the location of the 
registry the place where the conflict had to be resolved.  But even though 
the Heathmount court found it had in rem jurisdiction—that is, even though 
a domain name can be reified in this way—there is nothing that says it 
must be reified at all.  In fact, the Cyberpiracy Prevention Act treats in rem 
jurisdiction as an adjudicatory basis of last resort.  It provides that an in 
rem action is appropriate only if in personam jurisdiction over the alleged 
owner cannot be obtained. 42  There is, in short, little reason to focus any 
more on the “property” dimension of domain names than on the property 
 
 40. Lanham Trade-Mark Act, § 43(d)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (1998 & Supp. 2001). 
 41. 106 F. Supp. 2d 860, 868 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
 42. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
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dimension of other intellectual property rights.  The Convention takes the 
position that intellectual property disputes are transitory and that an action 
can be brought where there is adjudicatory authority over the defendant. 
(c) Arbitral Agreements and Awards and the New York Convention 
Limitation 
This Convention also requires membership in the New York 
Convention.  In order to avoid the creation of conflicting rules on 
enforcement of arbitral awards, this instrument leaves all such issues to the 
New York Convention. 
If domain names are included in this Convention, then reference 
should arguably be made to the ICANN dispute resolution system.43  This 
system is, however, nonbinding.44  Accordingly, there is nothing in that 
procedure that affects litigation under this Convention. 
Art. 3: Defendant’s Forum 
This article is carried over from art. 3 of the 1999 Hague Draft.  The 
comments of Nygh and Pocar are fully applicable. 
Consideration was given to add, as another definition for habitual 
residence, “where the defendant has an effective business establishment, 
when that State is also the State of plaintiff’s habitual residence.”  This 
definition would have attempted a compromise between traditional 
concepts of habitual residence, and the US  “doing business” basis of 
general jurisdiction.  (“Doing business” as applied by US courts, is a 
prohibited ground of jurisdiction under this draft Convention, see Art. 
16.1(f))  However, the additional definition (in effect, “doing business, 
plus”) was not considered necessary in light of Art. 6.2, which recognizes a 
broad geographic scope of jurisdiction when the forum is plaintiff’s 
residence, and when the infringing acts were intentionally directed toward 
the forum.45 
Art. 4: Agreements Pertaining to Choice of Court 
Like art. 4 of the 1999 Hague Draft, this provision permits the parties 
to select a forum for dispute resolution.  The chosen court must be one that 
has subject matter jurisdiction under local law.  Unless otherwise specified, 
choice of court clauses will be read as creating exclusive jurisdiction, in 
derogation of the power otherwise vested in other courts by this 
Convention.  The court chosen may not decline jurisdiction under Art. 13 
(except as required by this Article).  If the case is consolidated under Art. 
 
 43. See ICANN Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org. 
 44. Id. ¶ 4(k). 
 45. See discussion of Art. 6, infra . 
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14, then the court chosen by the parties should hear the consolidated case if 
it has subject matter jurisdiction to do so.  If it does not, then it should 
weigh the advantages of honoring the parties’ choice against the 
efficiencies to be obtained through consolidation elsewhere. 
This provision adds a feature to the 1999 Hague Draft in that it 
handles unilateral forum designations in a new way.  In the1999 Draft of 
the Hague Convention, forum selection clauses are generally enforceable.46  
However, the effect of this provision was limited by other articles.  For 
example, while consumers are permitted to rely on these agreements, a 
seller-imposed choice of forum clause is recognized only if the agreement 
was entered into after the dispute arose.47  In addition, a court was 
prohibited from exercising jurisdiction based solely on “the unilateral 
designation of the forum by the plaintiff.”48 
The revised Hague Draft suggests some changes will be made in this 
scheme.49 The prohibition on unilateral designations by plaintiffs is 
eliminated and instead, the principal version of art. 4 now provides: 
“Whether such an agreement is invalid for lack of consent (for example, 
due to fraud or duress) or incapacity shall depend on national law including 
its rules of private international law.” 
A footnote elaborates: 
This proposal seeks to confirm that the substantive validity of the 
choice of forum agreement is governed by the national law of the forum 
seised, including its choice of law rules. It also seeks to confine 
substantive validity to questions affecting the consent or capacity of the 
parties as opposed to questions of reasonableness and public policy.50 
The revised draft continues to treat consumer contracts separately.51  
However, the new provision includes several alternative  proposals on 
choice of forum clauses.  In general, agreements arising after the dispute 
will be enforced, but there is now some flexibility to enforce other 
agreements as well, so long as they conform to art. 4.  In some variations, 
the agreement must also be binding on both parties in the place where the 
consumer was habitually resident at the time the agreement was entered 
into.  There is also a proposal to give each member State leeway to enter a 
declaration on when it will enforce the judgment of a court whose 
 
 46. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra  note 1, art. 4. 
 47. Id. art. 7. 
 48. Id. art. 18(2)(g). 
 49. See Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the 
Diplomatic Conference 6 – 20 June 2001, Interim Text [hereinafter Revised Hague Draft], at 
ftp://hcch.net/doc/jdgm2001draft_e.doc. 
 50. Id. art. 4, n.24.  There are, however, variants to art. 4.  
 51. Id. art. 7. 
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jurisdiction is solely based on a designation in a consumer contract. 
All of these proposals were rejected here.  As was recognized in the 
process of drafting the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
(“UCITA”), “prepackaged” contracts are important to a variety of 
intellectual property transactions, particularly those involving software.  
Licensing is critical to efficient exploitation of intellectual works.  So-
called “shrinkwrap”or “click on” agreements allow products to be tailored 
and priced for the needs of particular consumers; they facilitate online 
ordering and retail selling; they lower the cost of doing business and hence, 
the price of products.52  As a result, generic prohibitions, such as the one 
found in the 1999 Hague Draft Convention,53 are not desirable.  Nor is it 
appropriate to rely on the domestic contract law of member States, as in 
more recent drafts.  Because forum selection is not a matter covered by the 
TRIPs Agreement, there could be wide variation among member States on 
enforceability.  As a result, relying on local law will make it difficult to 
predict the effect of a unilaterally imposed term, and this unpredictability 
will, in turn, affect the ability of sellers to accurately price their products.  
There are other undesirable consequences as well.  Use of the law of the 
forum first seized to determine enforceability will surely lead plaintiffs to 
shop for a forum where the scrutiny of such contracts is minimal.  Relying 
on the law of the place where the consumer is located is also unhelpful: 
many of these contracts arise online, making the consumer’s location 
difficult to determine.  Besides, consumer forum shopping (through, for 
example, use of a foreign service provider for making purchases) is no 
more desirable than seller forum shopping. 
Finally, to the extent special treatment for certain classes of 
transactions is needed, it is not appropriately confined to consumers.  While 
it is true that consumers may require safeguards, the technical nature of 
certain forms of intellectual products (like software) means that there are 
buyers who are not ordinarily considered consumers, who nonetheless need 
marketplace protection. 54 
This Convention therefore takes a different tack.  First, it defines a 
class of “nonnegotiated contracts,” which are subject to special scrutiny 
regardless of whether they are entered into by consumers or by businesses.  
These are contracts arising in transactions for information products where 
 
 52. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO . TRANSACTIONS ACT, prefatory note (2000), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucita1200.htm [hereinafter UCITA]; see also  ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir.1996). 
 53. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra  note 1, art. 18. 
 54. See UCITA § 102 cmt. 39. 
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the terms are entirely pre-packaged.  Since the seller is not willing to tailor 
these agreements to the needs of end-users, it is these contracts that, in the 
intellectual property industries, present the need for special safeguards.  
Thus, there is no separate provision for consumers.55 
Second, this Convention creates its own law for determining when a 
forum designation will be honored: the forum must be a reasonable choice, 
in light of the criteria set out in subsection 3.  Imposing a uniform rule on 
all forum selection clauses should largely eliminate the possibility that 
plaintiffs will shop for courts lenient on adhesion contracts.  A uniform law 
also makes it unnecessary to know where the consumer consummated the 
deal.  Most important, the listed criteria should influence party behavior 
and the substance of the contracts terms offered.  Because one of the 
criteria looks to whether the forum would have been appropriate in the 
absence of a forum-selection clause, those who want to be sure their forum 
selection will be honored will presumably choose a forum that is 
convenient to the other side and connected to the dispute.56 
The guidelines of subsection 3 largely echo the concerns animating 
Art. 13 on consolidation and Art. 14 on circumstances for declining 
jurisdiction.  In all three areas, the idea is to choose a court that is fair to all 
sides, in light of their resources and their capacity to cope with travel and 
foreign language and procedure.  In addition, all of these sections are 
designed to channel cases to the forum most suited to deciding the 
substantive issues arising in the dispute: a court whose law is likely to 
apply to a substantial part of the litigation, and—in the case of trademark 
[and patent] rights—the court best positioned to deal with questions 
involving registration and the consequences of an invalidity finding.  
Because many nonnegotiated contracts arise through online sales, the 
parties are uniquely likely to have some facility with the Internet.  As a 
result, the availability of online dispute resolution was added as a criterion 
that the court should consider in deciding whether the forum choice should 
 
 55. For other consumer protections, see Art. 7.2, supra, and comment to Art. 7, infra. 
 56. Cf. Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial SA v. Rocío Murciano 
Quintero 2000 E.C.R. I-4941, ¶ 24, available at http://curia.eu.int/common/recdoc/indexaz/en/c2.htm.  
In Océano Grupo, the European Court of Justice held that  
where a jurisdiction clause is included, without being individually negotiated, in a contract 
between a consumer and a seller or supplier within the meaning of [Council Directive 
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993] and where it confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court in the 
territorial jurisdiction of which the seller or supplier has his principal place of business, it 
must be regarded as unfair within the meaning of Article 3 of the Directive in so far as it 
causes, contrary to the requirement of good faith, a significant imbalance in the part ies’ 
rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.  
Id.  The European Court of Justice went on to hold that the court first seized must determine this issue 
of its own motion.  Id. ¶ 26. 
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be honored. 
Art. 5 Appearance by Defendant 
Making appearance a basis of jurisdiction raises three enforcement 
questions: what is the effect of a judgment rendered in the case of an 
appearance in which the defendant does not challenge jurisdiction; what is 
the effect if the defendant challenges jurisdiction; and what is the effect of 
a judgment when the defendant defaults.  This provision must be read in 
conjunction with Arts. 17 and 21, which also cover obligations regarding 
appearances and nonappearances. 
1.  Appearance without contesting jurisdiction.  This provision states 
the familiar rule that a party can waive objections to personal jurisdiction. 57  
This is true of both domestic personal jurisdiction rules and of the 
limitations on personal jurisdiction imposed by this Convention.  Thus, 
under Art. 5,  subsections 1 and 2, a party is deemed to submit to the 
court’s authority if the party joins issue without contesting jurisdiction.  
Issue is joined when a defense on the merits is filed.  If the other conditions 
of the Convention are met, the judgment is entitled to enforcement. 
In general, Art. 21 gives the court where enforcement is sought 
authority to verify the basis of the rendering court’s authority.  In the 1999 
Hague Draft, art. 27 (which is the provision analogous to this one) is 
unclear on the scope of this authority in the context of appearances.  Under 
one reading,  it seems that the enforcement court must satisfy itself that the 
defendant was subject to the court of origin’s authority under one of the 
other bases of jurisdiction listed in the convention.  In other words, it is not 
enough that defendant join issue; the court of origin must have also enjoyed 
a “white listed” basis of adjudicatory authority.  However, in combination 
with the Hague Draft’s provision on appearance jurisdiction,58 it can 
instead be argued that appearances are on the “white list” of agreed bases 
of jurisdiction.  This Convention is more explicit.  It clearly rejects the first 
approach of requiring an independent basis of authority.  Giving the 
defendant a chance to prevail on the merits, but to protest jurisdiction in the 
case of a loss encourages sharp practice, prolongs proceedings (itself a 
major problem in cases involving the use of information), and multiplies 
cost to the other side.  The ability to undermine a judgment after it has been 
entered is particularly problematic in consolidated adjudication, where 
considerable resources will have been devoted to the case by the parties as 
 
 57. This is in contrast to subject matter limitations: because these cannot be waived, Art. 4 
recognizes forum selection clauses only when the designated court has adjudicatory authority to hear 
the subject matter of the dispute. 
 58. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra  note 1, art. 5. 
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well as by the judicial system.  Accordingly, if the defendant elects to 
defend, the jurisdictional basis of the rendering court is not reconsidered: as 
under the second interpretation of the Hague Draft, the appearance itself is 
a basis of jurisdiction.  Art. 21.1 does, however, expressly provide that the 
obligations of the enforcing court are not diminished.  It must verify that 
the defendant did, indeed, choose to defend on the merits without protest.59 
2. Appearance contesting jurisdiction.  The draft Hague Convention is 
based on the assumption that defendants can contest jurisdiction.60  In most 
jurisdictions a defendant may simultaneously contest jurisdiction and 
defend on the merits.  In many places, the defendant may even appeal an 
adverse jurisdictional finding at the same time as the merits are appealed. 
If the defendant wins the challenge to jurisdiction, there is no 
problem: no judgment will be entered (or, if one was, it will be vacated).  
However, a difficult question arises when the defendant contested 
jurisdiction and lost.  At that point, the case will be tried and both the 
judicial system and the parties will expend resources on it.  Thus, there is 
strong temptation to regard both the merits and the jurisdiction issue as res 
judicata .  A prohibition on collateral attack in the enforcement court also 
encourages the parties to fully utilize the appellate system within the 
jurisdiction of origin and promotes voluntary compliance with the 
judgment. 
Nonetheless, both Hague drafts give the court where enforcement is 
sought the power to reconsider the jurisdiction issue.61  However, the court 
is bound by the factual determinations of the court of origin.  Because 
proper jurisdiction is so critical to the fairness and public acceptance of the 
entire international enforcement effort, the utmost should be done to make 
sure that contested jurisdiction decisions are rightly decided.  
Reexamination by a second court furthers the interest in accuracy.  It 
promotes careful procedures and reasoned decisions by the court of origin 
(which has an incentive to protect the enforceability of its judgments).  
Finally, dual examination could promote a dialogue among courts and thus 
more rapid development of legal precedents in the jurisdiction area–a 
matter of considerable importance in the early years of the Convention.  
Hague’s restriction on reexamining factual predicates represents an attempt 
to strike a balance between the interest in finality and the interest in 
 
 59. For a similar position, see Revised Hague Draft, supra note 49, art. 27A. 
 60. See Nygh & Pocar Report , supra  note 12, at 47 (“Paragraph 2 [of art. 5] gives the defendant 
the right to contest jurisdiction. Although the Convention does not seek to regulate procedure, a legal 
system that did not recognise that right would be in conflict with the Convention.”) 
 61. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra  note 1, art. 27; Revised Hague Draft, supra note 49, art 
27; see also  PROPOSE D FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 5 (2002). 
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accuracy.  This Convention softens that restriction by making factual 
findings presumptively correct.  Some of the issues involved in jurisdiction 
are mixed questions of law and fact; by making this a presumption, the 
Convention enables the court addressed to reach these questions more 
easily. 
3. Default.  Courts must have the power to enter default judgments; to 
do otherwise would encourage nonappearance and deprive plaintiffs of the 
opportunity to resolve their disputes.  Thus, Art. 5 permits the court to enter 
judgment despite nonappearance.  However, it is not appropriate for a court 
that lacks adjudicatory authority to decide a case.  Several safeguards are 
therefore supplied.  In places where jurisdiction can be examined sua 
sponte , Art. 5 directs the court to independently scrutinize the plaintiff’s 
assertions.  Art. 17 gives the court further power to assure itself that its 
authority is not predicated on a prohibited basis of jurisdiction when the 
plaintiff so requests or national law so requires.  Finally, Art. 21 gives the 
court where enforcement is sought considerable authority to reexamine the 
jurisdictional basis used by the court of origin: it must satisfy itself that the 
plaintiff’s assertions about jurisdiction are well-founded (subsection 3) and 
in making that determination, it is not bound in any way by the original 
court’s factual findings (subsection 2). 
Nothing in this Convention (or, for that matter, in the Hague drafts) 
explicitly requires either court to scrutinize the merits of the pla intiff’s case 
before entering or enforcing a default judgment.  Of course, in many 
places, judgment for plaintiff may not be rendered until there is such 
scrutiny. 62  Some jurisdictions also have rules that permit defendants to set 
the default aside and take new evidence.63  Because the resolution of 
intellectual property disputes can have important public consequences (for 
example, the publication of material of great interest may be enjoined), 
there are strong arguments for requiring the court of origin to look at the 
merits before entering a default judgment and for imposing a duty on the 
enforcement court to make sure this was done.  But there are problems with 
that position.  It may impose new procedures on member States; it 
encourages defendants to bypass the court of origin; and it opens the door 
 
 62. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2) (permitting hearings in cases where the plaintiff has not 
asked for a sum certain). 
 63. See, e.g. , FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c), 60(b); see also  1 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY OF JANUARY 30, 1877, AND THE INTRODUCTORY ACT FOR THE CODE 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES OF JANUARY 30, 1877 AS OF JANUARY 1988, §§ 330–47 (Simon L. Goren, 
trans. , Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1990); Alphonse Kohl, Romanist Legal Systems, in 16 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, ch. 6, at 83 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1984) (describing Dutch 
procedure). 
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to relitigation and to the examination by one court of another’s procedure.64  
Besides, there are other safeguards in place to protect defaulting 
defendants: Art. 18(1) requires the court of origin to determine whether the 
defendant received sufficient notice to mount a competent defense; Art. 
26.1(b) requires the enforcing party to produce documentary evidence of 
notice; and Art. 25.1(c) gives the enforcement court plenary authority to 
deny enforcement if its independent examination of the notice issue (both 
facts and law) indicate that the defendant was not properly notified.  Thus, 
it is only knowing, voluntary default judgments that will be entered or 
enforced.  Art. 25 also protects the defendant and the public interest by 
providing grounds for nonenforcement in cases where the plaintiff engaged 
in fraud or the judgment conflicts strongly with public policy. 
Art. 6: Infringement Actions  
This provision seeks to adapt the traditional fora for tort claims (place 
of impact of the injury, place from which the harmful conduct originated) 
to the digital environment.  On the one hand, it enlarges the scope of the 
forum’s competence in the case of multiterritorial infringements.  On the 
other, it limits competence when the defendant has endeavored to avoid 
acting in a particular territory.  Similarly, it would insulate Internet access 
providers from amenability to suit in fora for which the provider’s sole 
contact is the automatic and unmediated transmission of communications 
initiated by and destined for others. 
Art. 6.1(a) , designating the competence of “any State where the 
defendant substantially acted (including preparatory acts) in furtherance of 
the alleged infringement,” recognizes that an infringement may originate in 
States other than the one in which the defendant resides or has its principal 
place of business.  For example, defendant may reside in State A, but make 
the alleged infringement available to the public through a website located 
in State B.  When jurisdiction is asserted on this basis, the forum is 
competent to hear all infringement claims arising out of the communication 
of the infringement from the forum, whatever the territorial extent of the 
resulting infringements. 
Art. 6.1, inspired by art. 10 of the 1999 draft Hague Convention, 
adjusts to the intellectual property context that draft’s innovation, which 
makes general territorial competence in certain tort actions turn on whether 
the forum is the plaintiff’s residence.65  Under the approach suggested here, 
any State to which the alleged infringement was intentionally directed, will 
be competent to adjudicate not only claims arising from forum impact, but 
 
 64. Cf. Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 65. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra  note 1, art. 10(4). 
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also from impacts in other jurisdictions, subsections 6.1(b), 6.2.  
“[I]ntentionally directed,  including those States for which defendant took 
no reasonable steps to avoid acting in or directing activity to that State” 
means that the defendant sought to communicate the allegedly infringing 
content to that State, or at least did not turn away customers who responded 
to the availability of the communication in that State.  This provision also 
seeks to cover situations in which the initiator of the communication has 
located its principal place of business and/or the means of communication 
in the intellectual property equivalent of a “tax haven,” that is, a country 
known or expected to be particularly forgiving of the defendant’s activities.  
The relative paucity of a domestic market for goods or services provided by 
the defendant, compared with the market in countries to which the 
communication was intentionally directed may suggest that defendant has 
localized its business with an eye to forum manipulation. 
Art. 6.1(c) applies the traditional rule of competence of the place of 
the impact.  When this forum is not the plaintiff’s residence, that forum’s 
competence is limited to adjudicating claims arising out of infringements 
occurring within its territory, see Art. 6.3.  A further limiting principle is 
provided by specifying that this forum will not be competent if the 
“defendant took reasonable steps to avoid acting in or directing activity to 
that State.”  That language refers to efforts to screen out access from 
particular jurisdictions, for example, by requiring users to identify their 
country of residence, and excluding users from countries to which the 
defendant does not wish to communicate.66Technological measures that 
make it possible to limit internet communications to particular countries 
may well be on the horizon. 67 
It could be argued that these provisions violate US due process norms, 
as articulated by the Supreme Court.  For example, under World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,68 the combination of place of impact and 
foreseeability of remote harm did not fulfill due process standards.  In 
contrast, however, Art. 6 aims specifically at the activities of the defendant, 
not the “unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a 
nonresident defendant.”69  Recall that, in fact, the World-Wide Volkswagen 
 
 66. Cf. Torsten Bettinger & Dorothee Thum, Territorial Trademark Rights in the Global Village–
International Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and Substantive Law for Trademark Disputes on the Internet–
Part Two, 31 IIC 285 (2000).  The current draft revision of the Brussels Convention also employs the 
“directed to” concept to identify competent fora of impact of the alleged wrongful act. 
 67. See Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There?: Toward Greater Certainty for Internet 
Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH . L.J. l, available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/16_3/geist/geist.pdf. 
 68. 444 U.S. 286, 295–96 (1980). 
 69. Id. at 298 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
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Court specifically acknowledged that the manufacturer was amenable to 
suit in the forum; unlike the local car dealership, the manufacturer sought 
to “serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States.”70  
Similarly, the person who intentionally directs an Internet transmission to 
foreign jurisdictions, without “taking reasonable steps to avoid acting in or 
directing activity to that State,” can be deemed to be serving foreign 
markets.  As it becomes increasingly easy to segment the Internet,71 it 
becomes ever more reasonable to subject to jurisdiction a defendant who 
does not avail itself of opportunities to filter out unwanted countries of 
receipt.72  Moreover, there is reason to believe that a concern animating the 
World-Wide Volkswagen court was the fear that the law of a remote 
jurisdiction might wrongly be applied to the transaction. 73  This proposal 
addresses the problem of inappropr iate choice of law in Art. 25, on 
enforcement of judgments. 
Art. 6.4 attempts to address the concerns raised by Internet service 
providers regarding the proposed Hague Convention.  These entities fear 
that the criteria enunciated in Hague’s art. 10 could render them amenable 
to suit in any country through which a wrongful communication transits or 
is received—effectively, the whole world.  Here,  the criteria of Art. 6.1 
should shield service providers, as these criteria include an element of 
intent which a passive service provider would lack.  Art. 6.1(c) might at 
first appear more troublesome, as receipt in or transit through any 
jurisdiction is at least foreseeable, but the passive service provider 
generally is not in a position to “avoid acting in or directing activity to that 
State.”  For that reason, however, Art. 6.1(c) can be read as applying by its 
terms only to actors who, by virtue of their closer relationship to the 
communication, can effectively take steps to avoid certain States. 
Nonetheless, in order to clarify that a service provider should not be 
amenable to suit in a given State on the sole basis of its passive provision 
of connections, the language of the Online Service Provider Liability 
Limitation Act,74 excluding the substantive liability of mere conduit service 
providers for copyright infringement, has been adopted.  Similar language 
 
 70. Id. at 297. 
 71. See, e.g., Michael Geist, E-Borders Loom, For Better or Worse, Globetechnology.com 
[hereinafter Geist, E-Borders], at http://news.globetechnology.com (June 28, 2001); Jack 
Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199, 1213-16 
(1998). 
 72. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (looking 
at considerations of reasonableness to determine the assertion of jurisdiction in international stream of 
commerce cases). 
 73. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297; see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115. 
 74. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (Supp. 2001). 
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appears in the 2000 European Union E-Commerce Directive, with respect 
to substantive liability in tort generally.75 
A question remains whether a similar exclusion should be afforded 
other service providers, for example, proxy caches, and search engines.  
Because the role of these actors is less passive, and because they may be 
better situated to screen out certain fora, such a broad exclusion may not be 
necessary.76 
Art. 7: Agreements Pertaining to Intellectual Property Rights  
Jurisdiction based on contractual activity has long been controversial.  
There is considerable disagreement over the sorts of events that trigger 
contacts with the forum sufficient to support jurisdiction. 77  In many 
situations, it may even be difficult to determine where critical events took 
place.  In online transactions, for example, a buyer may enter a site through 
a foreign Internet service provider; to the seller, the transaction may then 
appear to be with a person at the location of the ISP.  Normatively, the 
voluntariness of one party’s affiliation with the jurisdiction of the other side 
can depend on their relative power, the structure of the market in which 
they are operating, and–for some information products–issues such as 
network effects, lock in, and compatibility.  Thus, general rules based 
solely on buying and selling activities are unlikely to work well.  The Nygh 
& Pocar Report on art. 6 of the 1999 Hague Draft raises other issues,78 and 
the difficulty of this problem is also reflected in the many alternative 
proposals being considered in the process of revising the Hague Draft. 
This Convention takes a somewhat different approach.  Rather than 
start with an examination of specific activities, it looks at whether the 
complaint raises contract issues.  If it does, then it deems the jurisdiction 
whose rights are in issue an appropriate place for the litigation.  Thus, if the 
contract dispute concerns the right to reproduce a book in France, it is 
French copyright rights that are at stake, and France is therefore considered 
a jurisdiction where the case can be adjudicated.  While it is true that the 
 
 75. European Parliament & Council Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal 
Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market 
(Directive on electronic commerce), art. 12, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 12.  See also Society of Composers, 
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers, 2002 FCA 166 
¶¶ 134, 186 (solving the ISP liability problem by separating substantive and jurisdictional issues and 
holding that copyright royalties should be imposed on cache operators, but not on other Internet 
providers; limiting jurisdiction to those servers having a “real and substantial connection to Canada”). 
 76. See, e.g., T.G.I. Paris,  Nov. 20, 2000, Order No. RG:00/05308 (credit ing expert reports that 
Yahoo! Inc.—the US entity—could have taken steps to prevent or discourage French web users from 
accessing Nazi sites through Yahoo!). 
 77. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (discussing 
place of signing, place of negotiation, and use of bank accounts). 
 78. See Nygh & Pocar Report , supra  note 12, at 48–50. 
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defendant may not have been physically present in France, the benefits 
gained from the protection of French copyright law should be enough to 
support the specific jurisdiction that Art. 7.1 envisions.  And since French 
law is likely to play a role in deciding the case, this provision also has the 
advantage of channeling litigation to the court with some (perhaps the 
most) expertise in resolving the dispute.  Another key benefit of this 
approach is that in the typical consumer case, this provision will steer the 
adjudication to an acceptable location: the place where the work is used, 
which is to say, a place where the consumer is located.  Consumers are 
further protected by Art. 7.2, which imposes an overriding test of 
reasonableness in the case of nonnegotia ted contracts. 
Some contracts encompass rights under more than one country’s law.  
In conformity with the general policy favoring consolidation which 
underlies this Convention, that possibility is dealt with in Art. 14, which 
directs the dispute to the forum with a close connection to the dispute.  In 
the case of contractual disputes, the factors considered  include the 
residence of the parties, the place where the obligations are performed, and 
the place where the intellectual property was developed. 
Art. 8: Declaratory Judgments  
Actions for a declaration of rights are particularly important to the 
intellectual property industries because commercialization often entails 
substantial investments.  Without the ability to bring “negative 
declarations” that permit a court to declare a particular product unprotected 
or within the scope of a license, these investments would have to be made 
without knowing whether the information was actually available for the 
investor’s use.  Should the investor guess wrong, sunk resources would be 
wasted.79  At the same time, it is not desirable for investors to shy away 
from using material that is in the public domain: there is, in fact, a strong 
public interest in the exploitation of material that is not properly the subject 
of intellectual property protection. 80  Art. 8.1 furthers these private and 
 
 79. The investment Kodak made in instant cameras is a good example of improvident investment.  
After the cameras were long on the market, Polaroid successfully sued for infringement.  Kodak, its 
employees, and customers were all seriously hurt .  See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 
1556, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Daniel F. Cuff, Kodak Reports a Loss After Taking Writeoff, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 19, 1986, at D6 (reporting that forced withdrawal from the instant camera field after patent ruling 
cost ing Kodak $494 million); Thomas J. Lueck, The Talk of Rochester; A City Nervously Waits for 
Layoff News, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1986, at B1 (describing losses to Kodak and its workers resulting 
from enforcement of Polaroid’s instant camera patent against Kodak). 
 80. Compare Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994), where the court stated: 
Because copyright law ult imately serves the purpose of enriching the general public 
through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright 
law be demarcated as clearly as possible.  To that end, defendants who seek to advance a 
variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them to the same 
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public goals by creating an avenue for clarifying rights. 
At the same time, however, declaratory judgment actions raise special 
procedural problems because they open forum shopping opportunities to 
would-be defendants.  An example is the “Italian torpedo,” discussed 
below in connection with Art. 12, in which a declaratory filing is made in 
an Italian court, where dockets move slowly, in order to block adjudication 
of an infringement action in a forum more likely to quickly award 
injunctive relief.  To avoid misuse of declaratory judgment actions, Art 
12.5 refrains from treating a court hearing a declaratory case as the court 
first seized for purposes of the lis pendens doctrine.  [Furthermore, Art. 
8(2) requires that actions for declarations of patent invalidity be brought in 
the State where the patent was registered.]  In this way, the Convention 
allows a rights holder to trump the declaratory plaintiff’s choice by 
bringing its own action; the court where the rights holder sues is then 
treated as the court first seized. 
[The principal use of this provision in patent litigation is likely to be 
as a mechanism for challenging patent validity.  An argument could be 
made that even if patent infringement actions are included within the scope 
of the Convention, actions invalidating them should be excluded.  The 
theory is that an attack on registration should be treated as a local action, 
and that it should therefore be heard only in the place issuing the right.  
This position is rejected here: all intellectual property claims are considered 
sufficiently transitory to be heard in any member State’s courts.  However, 
Art. 8.2 recognizes that the State of patent registration is the most 
appropriate forum to hear a case whose object is to declare that registration 
improper.  Art. 8.2 should be read as without prejudice to the power of a 
court hearing a coercive action (such as an infringement action) to 
determine patent validity (for instance, should it come up as a defense).  
Separating adjudication of validity from infringement prevents a court from 
hearing all of the evidence relevant to the action and from using its 
understanding of how a technology is utilized to inform its decision on the 
scope of the right. Bifurcating validity and infringement would also 
increase expenses for the parties. 
Another way to handle the registered-rights problem was suggested by 
Curtis Bradley at the behest of the US State Department negotiators of the 
Hague Convention.81  He would distinguish between rights among 
 
extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement. 
 81. See Special Commission on International Jurisdiction and the Effect of Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Work Doc. No. 97E, 
39, 122 (Nov. 10–20, 1998) (copy on file with authors) . 
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individuals and rights against the world.  Parties would be allowed to 
litigate their entire case in any forum that has jurisdiction under the general 
terms of the Convention.  However, if the case is litigated outside the State 
where the right was deposited or registered, the “status or validity of the 
deposit or registration of . . . rights [would have] effect as between the 
parties only.”82  This approach was rejected because the distinction 
between rights against a party and rights against the world is illusory.  
Experience shows that once the court of one commercially significant 
jurisdiction declares a patent invalid, the patentee cannot easily enforce the 
right, or counterpart rights, against any other party.  Furthermore, licensees 
who continue to honor the patent then compete at a disadvantage with 
respect to the judgment winner.  The result is that the patent does not serve 
its intended purpose of stimulating innovation by rewarding innovators.] 
Art. 9: Counterclaims and Supplemental Claims  
This section contemplates a broad right in all litigants to add claims 
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence.  The main reasons for 
this rule are to facilitate consolidation and to prevent the narrow scope of 
this Convention from requiring parties pursuing claims or enforcing 
judgments to proceed in several fora simultaneously.  The rule should not, 
however, be used in a way that permits parties to gain the benefits of the 
Convention for claims outside the scope of intellectual property.  For that 
reason, Art. 9 gives courts discretion to dismiss supplemental claims when 
they substantially predominate over intellectual property claims.  As noted 
above, this procedure is derived from US federal jurisdiction law.83 
Under this provision, judgments on related causes of action will be 
entitled to enforcement if the other requirements of the Convention are met.  
The ability to add supplemental claims is, however, also a matter of the 
domestic law of the court seized with the action.  It is significant to note 
that as global usage of intellectual property increases, courts have come to 
recognize as within their subject matter jurisdiction foreign claims, so long 
as they arise from transactions that also implicate local rights.84  However, 
courts are prone to dismiss these cases on forum non conveniens grounds.  
That subject is taken up below, in connection with Art. 14. 
Although the general approach of this draft Convention strongly 
favors consolidation of claims (see commentary to Arts. 10-14), it does not 
 
 82. Id. Doc. No. 122. 
 83. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994). 
 84. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 
1998); Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. Pte., Ltd., 1997-1 S.L.R. 621 (Sing. C.A.); Aztech Sys. Pte, 
Ltd. v. Creative Tech., Ltd, 1996-1 S.L.R. 683 (Sing. High Ct.). 
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go further and require compulsory joinder of related claims, nor does it 
impose stringent rules of res judicata that would regard omitted 
transactionally related claims as precluded.  Although US law so provides, 
such is not the rule in most countries; to impose it here would lead clients 
who are advised by attorneys unfamiliar with the US system to 
inadvertently lose their rights.  Under this Convention, plaintiffs may–but 
are not required to–present all claims arising out of the transaction 
including those that sound in foreign law.  Similarly, defendants may–but 
need not–present counterclaims arising under foreign laws.  As a result, 
parties who wish to resolve all their claims in a single forum may do so, but 
they cannot use res judicata law to curtail other parties’ abilities to preserve 
their claims. 
The net intended effect of Art. 9 is this: so long as the main thrust of 
the case is the enforcement of intellectual property rights, and supplemental 
claims presented by the parties are within the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction and not the subject of litigation in another forum, then the court 
seized with the action should hear the entire case. 
Arts. 10-14: Streamlining Adjudication: multiple defendants; 
third party claims; lis pendens, consolidation; exceptional 
circumstances for declining jurisdiction 
One difference between the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, on the 
one hand, and drafts of the Hague Convention on the other, is that the 
former allow courts other than the one first seized to suspend proceedings 
when related claims are pending in several fora.85  There is scant discussion 
of this omission in the Reports issued in conjunction with the 1999 draft 
Hague Convention.  One can, however, speculate that such a provision was 
omitted because consolidation has not proved popular in European 
practice.86  According to one commentator, Europeans tend to view “a civil 
proceeding more as an efficient adjudication of the plaintiff’s claim than as 
an equitable resolution of a dispute or, as in the United States, of an entire 
‘transaction or occurrence.’”87   
Nonetheless, as economic transactions become globalized, 
 
 85. See Brussels Convention, supra note 7, art. 22; Lugano Convention, supra note 7, art. 22. 
 86. See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and 
Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 218 (2001) (citing Samuel P. Baumgartner, Related 
Actions, ZZPINT. 3 at 207–10 (1998)). 
 87. Baumgartner, supra  note 86, at 210 (footnotes omitted).  This view may be changing among 
continental jurists, see, e.g., Coin Controls Ltd. v. Suzo Int’l (UK) Ltd, [1997] F.S.R. 660, 678–79 
(noting also that absent challenges to patent validity, patent claims derived from the same European 
Patent Office prosecution should be treated as related, if not the same, see id. at 673).  Cf. Expandable 
Grafts Partnership v. Boston Scientific, B.V., [1999] F.S.R. 352 (Hof (den Haag)), at ¶ 19 
(consolidating cases when the defendants are part of the same group of companies). 
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consolidation will undoubtedly prove increasingly necessary to achieve 
efficient resolution of disputes.  Significantly, despite the present lack of 
European practice, the revised Brussels Convention retains a consolidation 
provision. 88  For intellectual property, consolidation is especially 
important.  Rights in intangible works can easily be utilized around the 
globe, especially when they are embedded in products (such as digitized 
text files) that are themselves intangible.  Because multiple infringements 
in multiple jurisdictions can result from such distributions, the ability to 
consolidate actions in one forum would save significant resources not only 
for the parties, but also for the international judicial system as a whole. 
A more economical approach to multinational disputes may also 
curtail recent judicial tendencies to expand the reach of domestic laws to 
cover foreign infringements.89  Extraterritorial application of law has 
become worrisome to many observers because it interferes with sovereign 
authority by limiting the extent to which a State can control the local 
conditions under which information is produced, utilized, and accessed.  
Further, by imposing one jurisdiction’s law on activity in another location, 
extraterritorial application also undermines the TRIPs Agreement’s 
principles of nationality and minimum standards. Litigants who maneuver a 
court in their home country into providing them with remedies they would 
not be awarded in another country receive better treatment then rights 
holders in that other country.  As a result, the standards for protection in the 
second country in effect become the standards of the first.  However, as 
long as it remains difficult for intellectual property holders to pursue their 
rights (because of costs, or difficulties in acquiring jurisdiction over 
defendants in territories where there are claims), courts will likely make up 
for the shortfall by finding that local law covers distant activity. 90  
Permitting consolidated adjudication of worldwide claims facilitates 
efficacious resolution on a worldwide basis, and might thereby temper the 
extraterritorial impulse. 
Equally important, consolidation provides a way to avoid inconsistent 
results.  Because intellectual property law is not harmonized among 
contracting States, certain differences in outcomes are inevitable.  Some are 
 
 88. Revised Brussels, supra note 7, art. 28. 
 89. See, e.g. , Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2nd Cir. 1988) (applying 
US copyright law to infringements in Israel that resulted from an initial reproduction of the work in the 
United States).  See generally  Jane C. Ginsburg, The Private International Law of Copyright in an Era 
of Technological Change, 273 RECUEIL DES COURS  322–48 (1998). 
 90. See generally Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in 
Transnational Copyright Infringement Litigation , 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 19–20, 27–28 
(1999). 
 150 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 77:3  
also tolerable.  For example, an invention may be held patentable in one set 
of countries and not protectable in others.  So long as the right at issue can 
be exploited only by embedding the knowledge in physical products, there 
will be few problems associated with this apparent inconsistency: people 
who make, use, sell, offer for sale, or import a product in a country where it 
is patented will need authorization, even though the same usage could take 
place without permission elsewhere.  However, there are cases where 
differing outcomes are not acceptable.  For example, so long as the Internet 
remains geographically unsegmented,91 or entrepreneurs seek to engage in 
global marketing, multiple ownership of a trademark used on the Internet 
can confuse consumers, damage the integrity of  protected signals, and 
harm the reputation of rights holders.  Similarly, a decision by one State’s 
court to permit the streaming of copyrighted material can be undermined if 
another State enjoins it as infringement.  In such cases, it would be useful 
for one court to hear the entire worldwide dispute, and to find a resolution 
that can accommodate all interests at issue.92  No one jurisdiction is likely 
to write law that expressly deals with multinational disputes; consolidated 
litigation provides an important way for this law to evolve.93 
The ability to consolidate related world actions also furthers the goals 
of the TRIPs Agreement.  While it is true that every member State is 
required to protect intellectual property rights,94 the Agreement has a much 
looser standard regarding enforcement: countries are not required to treat 
intellectual property cases any differently from the way they “enforce their 
laws in general.”95  In countries where courts are backlogged, rights 
holders may find that they cannot quickly end infringement.  But if these 
claims could be joined to a suit pending in a court capable of acting 
quickly, then the effects of overburdened litigation systems will be 
attenuated. 
It has been suggested that facilitating consolidation of claims and 
recognition of judgments also has negative consequences.  One argument is 
that it will result in greater enforcement of intellectual property rights and 
hence, lead to reduced usage of information.  Under this view, tolerance of 
infringements is desirable, particularly for remote (and perhaps less 
 
 91. This is changing, however, see, e.g., Geist, E-Borders, supra note 71; Goldsmith, 
supra note 71. 
 92. Finding this outcome is a matter of the selection of an appropriate law to govern the entire 
transaction.  This issue is discussed in connection with Art. 25, infra . 
 93. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should 
Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000). 
 94. TRIPs Agreement, supra  note 2, art. 9. 
 95. Id. art. 41(5). 
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affluent) jurisdictions.  The problem for less developed countries is easily 
dealt with.  This proposed Convention is open only to WTO members 
whose obligations to implement the TRIPs Agreement have accrued.  As in 
TRIPs, the obligations of these countries can be minimized. 96  And, as 
noted earlier, consolidated treatment may reduce the incidence of high-
protectionist States extraterritorially extending their law to low-
protectionist countries.  If it does, then the special treatment TRIPs affords 
developing economies may be better effectuated through this provision 
than otherwise. 
More generally, consolidation has, in fact, benefits for both users and 
rights holders.  It preserves litigation resources and reduces opportunities 
for harassment.  The recent example of the litigation between a large 
computer software developer, Computer Associates (“CA”), and a much 
smaller competitor, Altai, illustrates the point.97  CA initiated a suit in New 
York for infringement of the copyright on a computer program.  After 
losing, CA brought another action, arising out of substantially the same 
transaction or occurrence, in France.  Altai was obliged to defend in both 
places, the Second Circuit having refused to enjoin the parties from 
pursuing the French claim on res judicata  grounds.  The court reasoned that 
French law applied to that claim, making it different from the one asserted 
in the US.  The court also observed that one of the parties to the French 
action would not have been subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, 
even had CA pleaded the French copyright infringement as part of its 
action in New York.  Under the approach proposed here, CA could have 
consolidated both claims in the New York federal court, because this 
Convention provides for personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants 
when there is a substantial connection between the forum State’s 
intellectual property rights and the dispute involving that defendant, or 
when the forum State is the only one in which all claims could be 
consolidated (see Art. 10).  Moreover, even had CA wished to retain the 
option of pursuing Altai in more than one forum, under this Convention, 
Altai could have raised the alleged French infringement as a declaratory 
judgment in the US proceeding (forum non conveniens no longer being 
available as grounds for dismissal in this instance, see Arts. 8 and 14). 
 
 96. See, e.g.,  WTO, Draft Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health , art. 5(b), 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) (noting the right of member states to use compulsory licensing 
and exhaustion rules to promote public health); id. art. 7 (extending deadlines for compliance with 
certain measures for least-developed countries); WTO, Draft Ministerial Declaration, art. 42, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1 (Nov. 14, 2001) (acknowledging the need to specially consider the integration 
of least developed countries in to the trading system). 
 97. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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Other negative consequences that have been suggested mirror the 
concerns expressed in the United States in connection with class actions, 
which also involve the aggregation of claims.  Thus, commentators have 
worried about the effect of requiring a single court to apply the law of 
many states, noting that it could produce inaccurate results.98  Some are 
concerned that courts will avoid that problem by stretching to find a single 
law applicable, in derogation of other legitimate interests.99  Still others 
have claimed that aggregation confers undue power on plaintiffs, arguing 
that the downside risk of liability can lead defendants to improvident 
settlement of meritless claims.100  The public-regarding component of 
intellectual property law could make such settlements–which may not be 
judicially reviewed–especially troublesome. 
Nonetheless, the position taken here is that these problems can be 
reduced to the point where they are outweighed by the benefits of 
efficiency and avoiding inconsistency.  As has also been noted in 
connection with class actions, both sides are equally affected by 
aggregation: knowing that it only has one chance to win, plaintiff is also 
under pressure to settle.101  Indeed, the recent case of Boosey & Hawkes 
Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co .102 supports the point.  After the 
Second Circuit consolidated claims under eighteen nations’ copyright laws, 
the case settled–for substantially less than was sought in the original 
complaint.103  Adjudication can be simplified by structuring it carefully: 
factual issues can be tried first, and then legal issues can be determined 
sequentially, on a country-by-country basis.104  When a set of States all 
have the same law on a particular issue, claims under all these laws could 
be tried together.105  In some situations, one law may reasonably be applied 
to an entire dispute.  Furthermore, experience with consolidated 
international cases may give courts the skill to find ways to further the 
interests of all relevant States, and to do so without sacrificing broader 
 
 98. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Market Approach to Tort Reform Via 
Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 909, 910 (1995). 
 99. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 820–21 (1985); Spence v. Glock, 227 
F.3d 308, 312–13 (5th Cir. 2000).  See generally Austin, supra  note 90. 
 100. See, e.g. , George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class 
Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521, 547 (1997). 
 101. See Bruce L. Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class 
Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1386 (2000). 
 102. 145 F.3d 481 (2nd Cir. 1998). 
 103. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT ch. 3.B.2. (6th ed. 2001). 
 104. Cf. Hay & Rosenberg, supra  note 101, at 1382. 
 105. For a series of suggestions on how to structure complicated cases, see Larry Kramer, Choice 
of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1996). 
 2002] Draft Convention 153 
interests in information dissemination. 106 
It is also important to remember that class actions are materially 
different from the aggregation device proposed here. The parties choose 
their own attorneys, obviating concerns about the adequacy of 
representation and the possibility of “sweetheart” deals that sell out the 
class for the benefit of the lawyers.  More important, because of 
fundamental clashes among the laws of the States affected and the current 
insufficiency of law to deal with the Internet, settlement may represent the 
best chance of resolving the dispute equitably.  The parties may, for 
example, be better positioned than a court to find a way for them all to 
utilize their trademarks in a nonconfusing way in cyberspace.107  If this is 
so, then the added inducement to settle created by aggregation should be 
counted as a benefit.  In any event, the court first seized is directed to 
decline consolidation if the benefits of efficiency cannot be obtained 
because of concerns over manageability. 
Both the US and EU have ways to avoid a multiplicity of suits over 
the same issues, but in both places, current practice makes complete 
consolidation rather difficult.  On the one hand, the Brussels and Lugano 
Conventions avoid parallel litigation on identical causes of action through 
the lis pendens doctrine.108  They also permit the court of a State where one 
defendant is domiciled to avoid the risk of inconsistent judgments by 
asserting jurisdiction over other defendants, so long as there is a connection 
between the forum State and the dispute.109  In addition, the presence of a 
domiciled defendant and connection between the State and the dispute 
permits the assertion of adjudicatory authority over third-party defendants 
for contribution and indemnification under local law.110 
 
 106. Consider, for example, Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. 
Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), which held unenforceable in the US a French order requiring 
Yahoo.com to prevent French users from reaching websites selling Nazi memorabilia.  Id. at 1194.  The 
US court’s articulated justification was to uphold First Amendment values.  Id.  However, the result of 
its decision may be that the French authorities block all communication with Yahoo, thereby depriving 
French residents of the opportunity to access other information on Yahoo.com’s site–surely a result 
even less friendly to free expression interests. 
 107. Significantly, such has also been the thinking of the WIPO.  See Joint Recommendation 
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on 
the Internet (with Explanatory Notes) , art. 13, WIPO Doc. 845(E) (adopted by The Assembly of the 
Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and the General Assembly of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) at theThirty-Sixth Series of Meetings of the Assemblies of 
the Member States of WIPO, Sept. 24 to Oct . 3, 2001) (giving the user of a trademark an opportunity to 
propose to the court an effective remedy prior to a decision on the merits of the case). 
 108. Brussels Convention, supra  note 7, art. 21; Revised Brussels, supra note 7, art. 27.  The Hague 
drafts include a similar provision.  1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra  note 1, art. 21. 
 109. Brussels Convention, supra  note 7, art. 6.1 (and related case law); Revised Brussels, supra 
note 7, art. 6.1; 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra  note 1, art. 14. 
 110. Brussels Convention, supra note 7, art. 6.1; Revised Brussels, supra note 7, art. 6.2; 1999 
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Despite these provisions, consolidation of intellectual property 
disputes cannot always be achieved in Europe for several reasons.  First, 
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions operate on the “assumption that there 
exists a fundamental jurisdiction based on the domicile of the defendant 
with the result that all other jurisdictions must be seen as exceptions which 
must be narrowly interpreted.”111  Second, they remit claims concerning 
the validity of a registered right to the country where the right is 
registered.112  The combined effect of these two principles is that there may 
be no member State able to entertain all aspects of a multinational 
infringement case.  In addition, the absence of a robustly functioning 
doctrine of forum non conveniens and the inflexibility of the lis pendens 
rule mean that even if there is a court with power to consider the entire 
case, it may be difficult to bring suits involving related causes of action to 
that forum. 
In the US, the possibilities for consolidation are in some ways better.  
Since there is no hierarchy among the courts with power over the litigants, 
there is often a range of locations where a dispute could be adjudicated.  
Because the parties to an action are forced by joinder rules, res judicata 
law, and related doctrines to assert all transactionally related claims,113 the 
full range of issues requiring adjudication will be aired in a judicial 
proceeding somewhere.  The courts seized then have an array of transfer 
tools to bring related parts of the dispute together, at least for some 
purposes.114 
In certain ways, however, the situation in the US is worse than in 
Europe.  Lis pendens as a doctrine is not known.  Although both state and 
federal courts can control parallel litigation by staying or enjoining second-
filed proceedings, they are not under a clear obligation to do so.  Moreover, 
there are circumstances where these doctrines are not available.115  As a 
 
Draft Hague Convention, supra  note 1, art. 16. 
 111. Nygh & Pocar Report, supra note 12, at 28. 
 112. Brussels Convention, supra note 7, art. 16(4); Lugano Convention, supra note 7, art. 16(4); 
Revised Brussels, supra note 7, art. 22.4. 
 113. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13 (recognizing certain counterclaims as compulsory); Marrese v. Am. 
Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985) (claim preclusion). 
 114. Within the federal system, these include 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406, 1407 (2001).  State-to-state 
transfers can be achieved through the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. 
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
 115. See Burbank, supra note 86, at 213–15 (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936) 
(stay); Nat ’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1961) (injunction)).  Burbank notes that 
in effect, a lis pendens doctrine operates among federal courts.  Id. at 213.  However, the abstention 
doctrine that the Supreme Court articulated in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), combined with the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2001), prevent 
federal courts from dealing with parallel state court litigation.  Burbank, supra, at 213. 
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result, there may be instances when courts will lack power to prevent 
multiple suits on the same or related claims.  Most important, the power of 
US courts to fully consolidate multijurisdictional disputes appears to be 
heavily constrained by due process concerns: it is said that, in every case, 
there needs to be a volitional relationship between every defendant and the 
forum State.116  Thus, there may be situations where all relevant parties 
cannot be joined in a single action. 
This proposal takes advantage of pro-consolidation features in both 
systems, and does so in a manner that should not raise constitutional 
objections in the United States.  One important part of promoting 
consolidation is the removal of constraints, such as those found in art. 12(4)  
of the 1999 draft Hague Convention and art. 16(4) of the Brussels and 
Lugano Conventions,117 on adjudicating registered rights cases outside the 
jurisdiction where the rights are registered.  But the main consolidation 
features are Arts. 10–14, which are intended to operate as follows: 
Art. 10.  Multiple Defendants  
Like art. 14 of the 1999 draft Hague Convention, this proposal 
empowers any jurisdiction in which one defendant is habitually resident to 
hear claims involving other defendants when the forum has an interest in 
the dispute and there is a risk of inconsistent judgments.  The commentary 
of the Nygh & Pocar Report on the operation of this provision and on why 
limitations were placed on the joinder of multiple defendants is relevant 
here, with two caveats. 
(a) Inconsistent judgments (subpart 1(a)).  This term requires 
elaboration because legal materials use it in many different ways, several of 
which are difficult to apply to intangible rights that can be enjoyed 
nonrivalrously.  Thus, in the Hague commentary, the term sometimes 
means that two courts find the facts of the case differently.  In other places, 
it means the parties are subject to different obligations (for example, one 
judgment requires a debt be paid, the other relieves the defendant of the 
obligation to pay).  In the US, inconsistency is sometimes defined rather 
stringently: two judgments are inconsistent only when it is impossible for 
the parties to conform to both. 118  The proposed Convention would adopt 
 
 116. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Co urt  of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 
U.S. 770, 776 (1984).  Significantly, the Hague negotiators dropped the multiple-party and third-party 
jurisdiction provisions from the latest draft, at least in part because of concerns over whether the 
assertion of such jurisdiction would raise due process concerns in the United States. 
 117. This provision is retained in art. 22(4) of Revised Brussels, supra  note 7. 
 118. See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Balt ., 733 F.2d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 1984) (interpleader 
case). 
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all of these views of inconsistency.  However, in order to fully respond to 
the special problems presented by the public goods aspect of intellectual 
property, it goes even further to include the situation in which the judgment 
of one court would undermine the law and policy of other member States. 
Consider as an example of these differing approaches, the facts of 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV,119 where television signals 
from the United States and Canada were picked up in Canada, and then 
streamed without authorization onto the Internet.  Because the defendants 
were Americans who retained contact in the US, but centered their 
activities in Canada, suit for copyright infringement could be brought in 
both countries.  In such litigation, the courts of both  countries might rely 
on the same facts, but because of differences in law, each court could reach 
a different result on the question whether the activity is infringing.  The 
United States could decide the activity is actionable, while a court in 
Canada could decide that the copyright holder’s interests were exhausted 
by the first transmission of the work, or that the activity is protected under 
Canada’s version of the fair use doctrine.  Are the outcomes inconsistent?  
Both courts relied on the same facts, so there would be no inconsistency in 
fact finding.  There is an obligation to pay only for retransmission into the 
United States, so there would be no inconsistency in obligations.  
Furthermore, it is possible for the defendants to conform to both US law 
and Canadian law by acquiring permission to stream.  Nonetheless, the 
differing outcomes are problematic.  So long as effective barriers to 
Internet sites cannot be erected, adhering to US insistence on authorization 
raises costs or reduces access in Canada, and thus trumps Canadian 
information policy.  Of course, the defendants might be able to stay out of 
the United States and avoid the effect of its judgment, but then the 
Canadian outcome would trump US policy.120 
Because one of the main benefits of consolidation is that it would 
permit a court to consider these sorts of differences among national rules 
and find ways to reconcile national interests, this is the kind of problem 
that should trigger the joinder power.  Thus, for purposes of the proposed 
Convention, the “risk of inconsistent judgments” should encompass this 
sort of clash between court judgments and national policies. 
(b) Due process.  As noted above, a traditional US analysis of personal 
 
 119. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, Nos. 00-121 & 00-120, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1013, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Jan 28, 2000); see also  Copyright Infringement: NFL, NBA Seek to Halt 
Retransmission of Telecasts; NFL v. TVRadioNow Corp., ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP., Feb. 9, 
2000, at 4. 
 120. For further discussion, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, An Alert to the Intellectual Property 
Bar: The Hague Judgments Convention, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 421. 
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jurisdiction would prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction over 
defendants whose contacts with the forum are only those described in art. 
14 of the 1999 draft Hague Convention or art. 6(1) of the Revised Brussels 
Convention.  This is because the relationship that is necessary under arts. 
14 and 6(1) is the one between the forum and the dispute, not the one 
between the forum and the defendant, as per US standards.  Apparently, the 
Hague negotiators were so concerned that this provision could not be 
accepted in the US that they eliminated this provision from the more recent 
draft of the Convention.  To remedy the perceived problem while retaining 
the ability to consolidate, Art. 10 proposes two different relationships as the 
basis for asserting multiple -defendant jurisdiction. 
1. Subpart 1(b).  Defendants subject to jurisdiction under subpart 1(b) 
are those seeking to utilize intellectual property recognized under forum 
law.  While utilization of protected material does not create a strong 
connection to the forum, it is a voluntary connection that produces, within 
the forum, the effects of undermining the exclusive positions of rights 
holders and licensees, attenuating the incentive available under the 
intellectual property system, and–in the case of trademarks–causing 
consumer confusion. Significantly, jurisdiction based on an “effects test” 
has been recognized in the US in antitrust and trademark cases,121 and in 
other contexts as well.122  Typically, it will have been alleged that the 
defendant committed an intentional act; that was expressly aimed at the 
forum State; and that caused harm, the brunt of which the defendant knew 
was likely to be suffered in the forum State.123  In the cases contemplated 
here, the effects may sometimes be more attenuated.  However, the 
interests of the forum and of the judicial system as a whole strongly favor 
consolidation as a means to avoid inconsistent outcomes.  While it is not 
clear how much these interests matter in a due process analysis, the 
combination of effects, the concern over inconsistency, and the US’s 
interest in maintain ing the value of its intellectual property rights may be 
enough to tip the balance in favor of permitting the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction. 124  Further, to the extent that power over non-US defendants is 
 
 121. The “effects test” has been established in antitrust cases.  Cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764, 795–96 (1993) (assuming that if there is legislative jurisdiction under the 
Sherman Act, a US court has power to hear the case).  It is also well known in trademark cases.  See, 
e.g., Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 122. See, e.g. , Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et , L’Antisemitisme, _145 F. Supp. 2d 
1168, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (asserting jurisdiction over the winning plaintiff in a French action on the 
theory that enforcing the judgment will affect the US plaintiff in the French case). 
 123. Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998) 
 124. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312–13 (1950). 
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governed by international standards of reasonableness,125 European 
reliance on this basis for asserting jurisdiction should also militate in favor 
of allowing a court to exercise jurisdiction in cases falling under this 
subpart. 
2. Subpart 1(c).  There may be situations where the commercial 
benefit of activity in one territory is dependent on parallel acts in other 
locations.  In such cases, it could be that there are few partic ipants who 
have contacts with all of the places where infringement takes place, but the 
enterprise as a whole necessarily contempla tes contact in each jurisdiction.  
This provision is intended to enable a court to fully resolve disputes arising 
from these “hub and spoke” situations.  Admittedly, contact between the 
forum and certain defendants will be extremely attenuated.  Nonetheless, it 
should be considered sufficient, even in the US.  It is akin to the conspiracy 
theory of jurisdiction that has been used by US courts in other contexts.126  
Moreover, while the Supreme Court has never expressly approved a 
concept of “personal jurisdiction by necessity,” the Court has allowed the 
limits of due process to be stretched when there would otherwise be no 
forum in which the dispute could be adjudicated and where there is some 
contact between the defendant and the forum.127  Here, the defendant will 
have affiliated himself with an enterprise deriving benefits from the 
forum’s intellectual property and with a party who is a forum resident.  
Again, to the extent that jurisdiction over aliens is determined by 
international standards of reasonableness, the fact that defendants in this 
situation would be subject to jurisdiction under European law should be 
relevant.128 
As to both parts, it has been suggested by William Dodge that it may 
 
 125. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court  of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(2)(j) (1987) (stating that “a state’s exercise 
of jurisdiction to adjudicate . . . is reasonable if . . . the person, whether natural or juridical, had carried 
on outside the state an activity having a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect within the state”). 
 126. See, e.g., United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 904, 912 (N.D. Ill. 
1999) (antitrust law); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692, 694-97 (D.D.C. 1973) (action against a 
religious sect).  See generally Ann Althouse, The Use of Conspiracy Theory to Establish In Personam 
Jurisdiction: A Due Process Analysis, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 234 (1983). 
 127. Compare Atkinson v. Superior Court, 316 P.2d 960, 966 (Cal. 1957) (en banc) with  Hanson v. 
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958).  See also  Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313 (1950).  Note also that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also contemplate some stretching of jurisdictional limits.  Thus, there 
is nationwide jurisdiction in interpleader actions, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2001) and FED. R. CIV.  P. 
4(k)(1)(C) ; and jurisdiction over defendants in federal question cases that is based on national contacts 
when there are not sufficient contacts with any one state, FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). 
 128. See, e.g., Expandable Grafts P’ship v. Boston Scientific B.V., [1999] F.S.R. 352 (Ct. App. The 
Hague, Apr. 23, 1998).  This so -called “spider in the web” theory of jurisdiction has not, however, been 
approved by the European Court of Justice.  See Fritz Blumer, Patent Law and International Private 
Law on Both Sides of the Atlantic , WIPO Forum on Private International Law and Intellectual Property 
(2001), at http://www.wipo.int/pil-forum/en/. 
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be possible to meet US domestic due process requirements using a general 
doing business theory (even though the Convention prohibits asserting 
jurisdiction on this basis) and to meet the Convention’s requirements under 
the multiple-defendant provision. 129 
Art. 11  Third Party Claims  
This provision is taken from art. 16 of the 1999 Draft Hague 
Convention and is adapted to make clear that third parties can be 
summoned to the jurisdiction only when they have entered into a 
relationship regarding the intellectual property of the forum, thus making 
the assertion of jurisdiction over them reasonable.  The comments of the 
Nygh & Pocar Report, along with the commentary above on Art. 10, are 
relevant. 
Art. 12  Lis Pendens  
Because the jurisdiction rules in this Convention will often point to 
more than one location with power to hear a case, provision must be made 
to avoid parallel litigation.  Americans are comfortable with solving this 
problem by giving courts discretion to decide on an appropriate forum. 130  
However, there is profound disagreement on this issue in other places.  The 
practice in Europe, for example, is to give absolute preference to the court 
first seized.  Once it is determined that this court has jurisdiction to hear a 
case, other courts entertaining the same cause of action must suspend 
proceedings, and if the other case goes forward they must ultimately 
decline jurisdiction. 131  Courts entertaining related causes of action may, 
upon application of the parties, also stay out, so long as the court first 
seized has jurisdiction over these related claims.132  There is no authority to 
transfer the resulting case to any other court.  The 1999 Hague Draft is 
slightly different.  It establishes a presumption in favor of the court first 
seized with respect to the same cause of action,133 but the presumption can 
be rebutted when the court second seized, or in exceptional circumstances, 
another court, “is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute.”134  (As 
 
 129. William S. Dodge, Antitrust and the Draft Hague Judgments Convention , 32 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 363, 378–79 (2001).  See also the discussion of contacts in the context of Art. 6 on 
infringement act ions, supra. 
 130. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2001). 
 131. Brussels Convention, supra note 7, art. 21; Lugano Convention, supra note 7, art. 21; Revised 
Brussels, supra note 7, art. 27. 
 132. Brussels Convention, supra note 7, art. 22; Lugano Convention, supra note 7, art. 22; Revised 
Brussels, supra  note 7, art. 28.  Under all three documents,  related causes of action are those that are so 
closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. 
 133. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra  note 1, art. 21. 
 134. Id. arts. 21(7) & 22. 
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earlier noted, the Hague Convention does not have a consolidation 
provision.) 
This proposal follows the Hague draft’s lead.  It too sets up a 
presumption in favor of the forum first seized and it allows for rebuttal of 
the first-seized presumption.  However, it requires consolidation of exactly 
parallel litigation and expands the circumstances in which the court first 
seized can decline the case.  In situations where litigation on related claims 
are pending in several fora, and strong benefits could be obtained through 
consolidation, the court first seized has the power to use discretion–
informed by the parties–to find a forum well suited to resolve the entire 
dispute. 
The comments of the Nygh & Pocar Report on the 1999 Hague Draft 
are relevant, with the following caveats: 
(a) Scope of required consolidation.  The 1999 draft Hague 
Convention uses the term “causes of action,” which the Nygh & Pocar 
Report rightly points out can be confusing.135  Art. 12 clarifies the concept, 
without expanding its scope (given the Report’s expansive definition), by 
referring to claims arising under a single territory’s intellectual property 
right, created through the defendant’s alleged activity.  For example, in a 
dispute between a Mexican and an American over the latter’s intentional 
use in Mexico of the former’s intellectual property, the case could properly 
be brought in the US (per Art. 3) or in Mexico (per Art. 6).  If the court first 
seized is the US court, then that court would be the only one authorized to 
hear the case.  If the defendant were to later file a declaratory action 
involving the same claim in Mexico, the Mexican court would be required 
to suspend proceedings and then dismiss the case after the US court renders 
judgment.  In that way, the plaintiff’s decision to sue in the US, where the 
defendant’s assets were located, would be honored and an attempt to split 
the case would be foiled.  Were the Mexican court to nonetheless render a 
judgment, it would not be entitled to enforcement, see Art. 25.1(b). 
(b) Registered rights.  Because the 1999 draft  Hague Convention 
assigns exclusive jurisdiction over registered rights cases to the State where 
the rights are registered, certain intellectual property claims cannot be 
consolidated in the forum first seized.  To the extent that this proposal 
subsumes registered rights, it facilitates a higher degree of consolidation. 
(c) Declaratory judgment actions. Art. 12.5 creates an important 
exception to the presumption in favor of the court first seized.  It does so 
because declaratory judgment actions present special problems.  As both 
 
 135. Nygh & Pocar Report , supra  note 12, at 85. 
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the Hague drafters and the ALI’s International Jurisdiction and Judgment 
Project recognize, these actions could be used by a potential defendant to 
preempt a plaintiff’s choice of forum and to defeat the jurisdiction of the 
most appropriate court.136  In litigation involving information products, this 
problem is particularly  severe.  Because information cannot easily be 
withdrawn once released, injunctions can be especially important; 
declaratory actions in courts hostile to preliminary injunctive relief can 
deprive rights holders of a critical remedy. In Europe for example, “Italian 
torpedoes”–declaratory judgment actions in Italian courts–are used to 
prevent the courts in other European countries from issuing trans-border 
injunctions in patent cases.137  They may even be used to prevent local 
injunctions from issuing in other countries.138 
To prevent this especially corrosive kind of forum shopping, this 
provision follows the Hague draft’s lead by allowing a court seized with a 
coercive action–typically, an action for intellectual property infringement–
to disregard the presumption in favor of the court first seized when the 
action in that court is solely declaratory.  Instead, the court hearing the 
declaratory case must suspend its proceedings and allow the coercive 
action to go forward.139  For instance, if the American in the previous 
example were to preempt the Mexican by bringing a declaratory action in 
the Mexican court,  (in an effort, perhaps, to take advantage of docket 
congestion to delay judgment), a US court later seized with an infringement 
action could ignore the action pending in Mexico.  In that situation, the first 
judgment entered would be the one entitled to enforcement under this 
Convention. 
(d) Negating the presumption in favor of the court first seized.  The 
1999 draft Hague Convention includes two ways to rebut the presumption 
in favor of the court first seized: through the forum non conveniens 
 
 136. See id. at 87–88; PROPOSED FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 8 
(2002) and associated commentary. 
 137. See Robin Jacob, The Deioma Lecture: International Intellectual Property Litigation in the 
Next Millennium, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 507, 511 (2000); Paul A. Coletti, No Relief In Sight: 
Difficulties in Obtaining Judgements in Europe Using EPO Issued Patents, 81 J. P AT. & T RADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 351, 367 (1999). 
138.See Trevor C. Hartley, How to Abuse the Law and (Maybe) Come Out on Top: Bad-Faith 
Proceedings Under the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, in James A R Nafziger and 
Symeon Symeonides (eds), Law and Justice in a Multi-State World: A Tribute to Arthur T von Mehren 
73 (Transnational, 2002). 
 139. This is in accordance with practice in the US.  See, e.g., Elbex Video Ltd. v. Tecton Ltd., 57 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1947, 1949 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (refusing to follow the Second Circuit’s first-to-file rule by 
dismissing a case in favor of allowing the case to be heard by a California court where a declaratory 
judgment action was filed on the ground that circumstances demonstrated that the California action had 
been filed “in order to deprive plaintiff of its choice of forum.”). 
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doctrine,140 which puts several courts into play as the target of transfer, and 
through its provision of limited circumstances that allow a court to transfer 
an action to the court second seized.141  Since this Convention creates more 
liberal rules on transfer, there is no need for a second way to rebut the 
presumption. 
(e) Determining when a court is seized.  As Nygh & Pocar note, it is 
important to prevent ambiguity  as to the time when a court is seized.  This 
provision is adapted from the Revised Brussels Convention,142 on the 
theory that its position is based on substantial experience with the 1968 
Convention. 
Art. 13 Consolidation 
This article is based on the practice contemplated by  the Brussels 
Convention. 143  It facilitates centralized  adjudication of a multinational 
dispute through, essentially, transfer of related actions to a single forum if 
consolidated proceedings would more efficiently resolve the dispute.  The 
section also provides guidance on how that choice should be made.  In 
general, cases would be consolidated when there is a risk of inconsistent 
judgments (as previously defined) or when other efficiencies will be 
obtained, and the benefits of consolidation would outweigh the potential 
increased difficulty of managing the litigation. 
Once it is determined that cases should be consolidated, the next 
question is, where.  Although the lis pendens provision could be expanded 
to centralize the dispute in the court first seized with the action, thereby 
limiting judicial discretion in accordance with (what can be perceived to 
be) the preferred approach outside the United States, the rigidity of that 
solution was rejected.  It would give the first plaintiff too much control 
over the litigation.  More important, it would sometimes situate litigation in 
a court ill suited to the task of dealing with complex matters or in a court 
far removed from the center of gravity of the dispute.  At the same time, 
however, the controversy over judicial discretion must be avoided.  This 
proposal presumes that when related cases are pending before several 
tribunals, the court seized first will take the lead oar.  Under Art. 13, the 
presumption is that this is the court that will decide the case.  However, 
Art. 14 gives it cabined power to defer to another court.  This procedure not 
only adheres to a procedure with which much of the world is familiar, it 
 
 140. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra  note 1, art. 22. 
 141. Id. art. 21(7). 
 142. Revised Brussels, supra note 7, art. 30. 
 143. Brussles Convention, supra note 7, art. 22.  This provision is carried over to art. 28 of Revised 
Brussels. 
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also avoids the prospect that courts will handle the related cases in 
inconsistent ways. 
As with the lis pendens rule, the consolidation provision is enforced 
through Art. 25.1(a) and (b).  That is, if a claim is consolidated in a 
particular court, then the judgment of any other court on that claim is 
denied enforcement.  The enforcing court is not free to reexamine 
consolidation decisions: if, for one reason or another, some related claims 
were not consolidated and instead tried separately, any resulting judgments 
should be enforced. 
Art. 14: Exceptional Circumstances to Decline Jurisdiction 
This section, which is akin to the US practices of forum non 
conveniens and transfer, gives the court first seized power to defer to 
another forum.  As such, it does double duty.  It guides a court in 
determining whether another forum is a more appropriate place to 
adjudicate a case, and it provides guidelines for deciding where a 
consolidated case should ultimately be heard.  As in the 1999 Hague 
Draft,144 a court’s power to unilaterally refuse to exercise jurisdiction is 
highly circumscribed: the circumstances must be “exceptional” and the 
other forum must be clearly more appropriate.  However, under this 
Convention, it is not necessary–as it is under the Hague Draft–to find that 
the court first seized is an inappropriate forum.  Again, too much rigidity 
would give an inappropriate level of power to the first plaintiff; it would 
encourage races to the court house; and it could prevent a court better 
suited to the task from deciding the case. 
All of the grounds for finding a case exceptional that are found in the 
Hague draft are included here.  They are supplemented by grounds needed 
to determine the most appropriate forum for consolidated adjudication. 
(1) Factors for deciding to defer to another court in all cases. 
Subsections 2 (a), (b), (c), (d): inconvenience, location of evidence, 
limitations periods, recognition: These provisions are taken from the 1999 
draft of the Hague Convention and the Nygh & Pocar Report provides the 
relevant commentary. 145  As reported by Nygh & Pocar, the court is to 
compare how well each of the litigants will fare if the case is transferred.  
This requires consideration of the distances the parties will be required to 
travel as well as each party’s ability to hire lawyers and to deal with 
unfamiliarity of procedure, substantive law, and language.  The court 
should, in other words, consider the relative resources of the parties and 
 
 144. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 22. 
 145. Nygh & Pocar Report, supra  note 12, at 91–92. 
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their capacity to cope with the demands of litigating in each of the potential 
fora.  Also, since experience under the Brussels Convention demonstrates 
that fora can differ markedly in their capacity to clear their dockets, the 
court should consider whether the case would be decided as speedily if it 
was adjudicated in a different forum.  Note that the relevant issue is how fit 
the parties are to deal with these issues; not how these matters affect the 
outcome.146 
Subsection 2(e): Significant relationship .  This section contemplates 
the situation where it will be clear that a single State has a closer 
relationship to the case than any other, and suggests that a forum in that 
State should entertain the case.  For example, cases that involve 
domiciliaries (habitual residents) of a single State or rights under a single 
State’s laws should, all other things–including the relative resources of the 
parties–being equal, be moved to that State;147 actions concerning contracts 
wholly negotiated in a single State should be adjudicated in the State where 
the contract was negotiated; infringements that occur wholly within a 
single State should be lit igated there. 
In addition, a court should consider deferring actions largely centered 
around the validity of registered rights to a court in the place of 
registration.  As noted in other places, this Convention rejects the notion 
that intellectual property disputes based on registered rights are local 
actions that can only be heard at the place of registration.  Nonetheless, in 
actions in which a main claim is that a right was improperly registered, the 
law of the place of registration will be of prime importance.  Moreover, the 
only courts that can easily control invalidation, nullification, or revocation 
are the fora of the State of registration.  Thus, if registration is the main 
issue in a dispute, then a court in the State of registration is likely to be the 
most appropr iate forum. 
In some cases, particularly those involving consolidation, more than 
one jurisdiction’s registration will be in issue.  But even in these cases, 
there may be a most appropriate forum.  For example, under the Madrid 
Agreement, invalidation of a trademark registration in the country of origin 
within five years of the international registration date leads to invalidation 
of the trademark right in all other member States.148  In a trademark case 
 
 146. Cf. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1981). 
 147. Cf.  Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.Com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Va. 2000) 
(questioning whether it would not be better to have resolved a domain name dispute between two 
Canadians in Canada instead of in the US). 
 148. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, as last 
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967 (amended 1979), art. 6.3, 828 U.N.T.S. 389, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal_texts/pdf/madrid_agreement.pdf. 
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involving this provision, a court in the State of origin should hear the case. 
[Subsection 2(f): Expertise in patent cases.  The patent bar has been 
particularly wary of the Hague Convention because, among other things, it 
is concerned about the complexity and technical difficulties that patent 
cases present to lay judges.  The bar points out that national patent laws are 
more diverse from one another than are other intellectual property laws.  As 
a result, judges are less likely to decide foreign patent cases accurately.  
Moreover, many jurisdictions channel patent cases to specialized tribunals.  
The benefits of channeling would be undermined if a foreign court were 
allowed to decide some of these cases. Many patent lawyers thus do not see 
a role for consolidation; they would prefer to have every patent case 
decided by a court of the State whose law is in issue. 
These are, of course substantial problems.  The Convention’s 
approach to dealing with them is to give courts entertaining patent cases 
authority to defer adjudication to courts with patent law expertise.  In cases 
involving the law of only one State, this will presumably be a court in that 
State, producing the result the patent bar favors.  In consolidated actions, 
the import of this subsection will be slightly different.  There are several 
States around the world that maintain specia lized tribunals for adjudicating 
patent cases.  The UK Patent Court (or the EU patent court that might take 
its place) and  the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are examples. 
The notion here is that litigation in multinational cases should be directed 
to systems with these type of fora.  Since most multinational disputes are 
likely to include claims under the law of at least one State that has such a 
court, this choice will usually be available.  Admittedly, the expertise of the 
judges on these courts is currently in their own country’s patent law.  
However, their ability to handle technical materials and their intimate 
knowledge of core patent principles (such as those imposed on all member 
States by the TRIPs Agreement) would likely make them at least as good at 
handling foreign patent cases as generalist judges in the country whose law 
is in issue.  Hopefully, this benign form of forum shopping would 
institutionalize over time, so that a specific set of courts would handle most 
consolidated patent actions.149] 
(2) Additional factors to be considered in consolidated cases 
Subsection 3(a): Authority over the parties.  In many instances where 
the claims are related enough to consolidate, Arts. 10 and 11 will give all 
(or most) of the courts where actions are pending authority over all the 
 
 149. Cf. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect 
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 903 (2001) (showing that patent cases in the United States tend to 
channel to ten judicial districts).  
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defendants.  But in cases where there are significant differences in 
adjudicatory authority, the court chosen for consolidation should, other 
things–such as resources–being equal, be the court with adjudicatory power 
to hear as much of the worldwide dispute as is possible. 
There may be cases in which a court is asked to decline jurisdiction 
because it lacks adjudicatory authority to consolidate all of the claims that 
could potentially be asserted, and there is another forum with the power to 
consolidate all those claims.  In such cases the court should take account of 
where the most significant economic impact lies.  Thus, while another court 
may have power over more parties (or more claims under subsection 3(b)), 
the court first seized may nonetheless choose to retain jurisdiction because 
it is the forum of the most significant economic impact. 
Subsection 3(b): Authority over the subject matter.  As noted earlier, 
although this Convention facilitates joinder, it does not require member 
States to alter the subject matter jurisdiction of their courts.  Accordingly, 
one factor in determining the right court is whether the parties can assert all 
claims relating to the transaction, including claims based on foreign law.  
By the same token, this is a factor in choosing the forum for a consolidated 
action: the court chosen should, all other things being equal, be one with 
the power to handle as much of the dispute as possible.  See also the above 
comment to subsection 3(a). 
Subsection 3(c): Contract cases.  As noted in Art. 7, multinational 
contract disputes should be adjudicated in the forum with the most 
significant relationship to the contract. 
There may cases where jurisdiction under this provision raises fairness 
(due process) concerns.  In the US, for instance, it could be argued that if, 
say, a suit encompasses rights under US, German, and Japanese law, then it 
is general, rather than specific, jurisdiction that is at issue.  As a result, 
more contacts with the forum are necessary.  But as the discussion of 
consolidation elaborated, there are strong reasons to believe that even US 
concepts of due process would be satisfied.  The contract is the “but for” 
cause of the litigation, thus an argument could be made that jurisdiction is 
specific even in the case of multinational rights.  Moreover, the cases that 
involve rights under several countries’ laws will typically be commercial 
contracts and the parties will have multiple contacts with the jurisdictions 
at issue.  They will also be parties with enough sophistication to use forum 
selection clauses whenever it is important to be certain of the forum in 
advance.  The interests of the parties and judicial system in efficient 
resolution may also come into play in the analysis. 
Factor 3(c)(2), the country in which the intellectual property was 
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developed, is new and thus requires further discussion.  The notion is that 
the act of licensing a work with an obvious national identity is enough 
contact with that nation to support jurisdiction.  Further, because one of the 
principal functions of intellectual property law is to stimulate and shape the 
creativity of a nation’s citizenry, the country where the work was 
developed has a very strong interest in the dispute and perhaps even 
insights, and access to the evidence, needed to resolve it.  For example, the 
decision to make a film of a French book written in France by a French 
national, is a voluntary and foreseeable affiliation with France; if the 
dispute raises questions of authorship, it is French law and French materials 
that will likely be in issue.Given this intent, the country of development 
should be understood as encompassing factors such as the place where the 
work was physically created, developed, or invented; the residence and 
nationality of the person or commercial entity most closely responsible for 
the work’s existence; the place where the work was first utilized, published, 
or registered.  In some cases, these factors will point in several directions.  
If that is the case–if the work has no readily identifiable locus–then this 
criterion should not be utilized to determine jurisdiction. 
An argument could be made that the better approach would be to fully 
incorporate into this Convention the “country of origin” concept that is 
already familiar to the international intellectual property bar.  That position 
was not adopted.  First, each international instrument uses the term 
differently.  For example, the main criterion of origin for copyrighted 
works under the Berne Convention is the place of first publication;150 the 
Paris Convention defines the country of or igin for trademarks as “where the 
applicant has a real and effective industrial or commercial establishment, 
or . . . his domicile, or . . . the country of which he is a national”;151 in the 
EU’s Satellite and Cable Directive, the country of origin is the place where 
the signals were introduced into the chain of communication. 152  Second, 
the term is not in general use in connection with certain of the rights that 
are covered by this Convention.  Third, to the extent first publication is the 
main criterion, it is problematic for cases involving Internet distribution 
because the place of first publication is not always determinate (or 
particularly relevant).153  Accordingly, this Convention rejects first 
 
 150. Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(4)(a). 
 151. Paris Convention, supra note 6, art. 6quinquies. 
 152. Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the Co -Ordination of Certain Rules 
Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to Satellite Broadcasting and Cable 
Retransmission, 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15. 
 153. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Cyberian Captivity of Copyright: Territoriality and Authors’ Rights 
in a Networked World, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH . L.J. 347, 351–52 (1998–1999). 
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publication as a sole criterion.  The factors it uses are not entirely 
unknown: as noted above, they are used in the Paris Convention; they are 
also used in the Berne Convention for unpublished works.154  One factor 
that could be adopted from the labeling context is the rule that every good 
has only one country of origin, no matter how many sources of inputs were 
involved.  However, such a procedure would not appear to further the goal 
of finding the best forum to resolve the dispute. 
(2) Nondiscrimination. 
Nationality and habitual residence.  Section 4 bars the court 
considering whether to decline jurisdiction from taking into account the 
nationality or habitual residence of the parties.  The comments of the Nygh 
& Pocar report are relevant as these factors are carried over from art. 22 of 
the 1999 Hague draft.155 
Foreign law.  Section 5 bars the court from considering the presence 
of foreign law.  This is new to this Convention.  It was included because 
otherwise, the goal of consolidating worldwide claims, which is a key 
motivator of this proposal, would be undermined. 
Today, it is common practice for common law courts that have forum 
non conveniens discretion to dismiss foreign claims within  their subject 
matter authority.156  This Convention would require a change in that 
practice, but it would also significantly weaken the rationales that support 
it.  Thus, one justification is that intellectual property actions are local, not 
transitory causes.  Adoption of this Convention necessarily represents a 
 
 154. Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(4)(c).  There are “country of origin” definitions in other 
statutes as well.  For example, the US federal marking statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1304, requires every item 
imported into the US to be marked in a manner that indicates “the country of origin of the article.”  
Australia’s Free Trade Practices Act similarly requires country of origin representations on imported 
products.  See Alexander Moriarty, Australia: Trade Legislation—Country of Origin Product Labeling, 
5(3) INT. T.L.R. N17 (1999).  International trade agreements have similar requirements. See, e.g., North 
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 311, 32 I.L.M. 289, available at the Organization 
of American States website, http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp .  However, the definitions 
provided in these agreements are not appropriate here.  First, there is no general international agreement 
on a single definition.  Second, these measures apply to tangible goods, where the main problem is 
determining how much transformation in the state of the goods is necessary to change the country of 
origin designation.  Transformations are sometimes a problem in intellectual property (a book can be 
transformed into a play, for example).  However, the main problem will often be that the work is 
created by mingling multiple international inputs.  Cf. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative 
Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability , 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161 (2000).  
Thus, the rules used for goods are not apposite. 
 155. See Nygh & Pocar Report, supra  note 12, at 92. 
 156. See, e.g., Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287 (2d Cir. 1996) (copyright); Creative 
Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. Pte., Ltd., 61 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1995) (copyright).  Cf. Mars Inc. v. 
Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed.Cir. 1994) (declining to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over foreign patent claims).  For commonwealth examples, see Plastus 
Kreativ A.B. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., [1995] R.P.C. 438, 447 (Eng. Ch. 1994); Potter v. 
Broken Hill Proprietary Co., (1906) 3 C.L.R. 479, 492 (Austl). 
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rejection of that theory.  Another theory is that intellectual property laws 
are “public rights.”  Again, the decision to join this Convention means that 
a State agrees to allow foreign courts to construe and apply its intellectual 
property laws.  Some courts consider foreign rights too difficult to 
adjudicate.  While that may be a factor in patent cases, the convergence of 
the other branches of intellectual property law make this a weak reason to 
dismiss foreign copyright or trademark claims, or the claims that come in 
under the unfair competition rubric.157  Moreover, courts are increasingly 
called upon to apply foreign law, even when local rights are in issue.158  
Finally, courts may be motivated to dismiss foreign claims because they are 
concerned that they will spend time on a case only to find their judgments 
unenforceable.  Joining this Convention obviates much of that concern.  To 
the extent it survives, it should be ameliorated by the court’s power under 
Art. 14.2(d) to choose a forum that can render an enforceable judgment. 
Art. 15: Jurisdiction Based on National Law 
This provision is carried over from art. 17 of the 1999 Hague Draft 
and the comments of Nygh & Pocar apply.  Like the Hague Convention, 
this Convention contemplates a grey area, where courts may exercise 
jurisdiction, but the parties cannot expect that the judgment will be 
enforced.  Enforcement in these cases will depend on basic principles of 
comity. 
Art. 16: Prohibited Grounds of Jurisdiction 
This proposal adopts most of the prohibited grounds of jurisdiction set 
out in the 1999 Hague Draft, notably the “doing business” basis, see Art. 
16(1)(f).  As indicated in the Comment to Art. 3, however, Art. 6.2’s 
provision for expanded territorial competence, when the infringement 
impacts in the forum of plaintiff’s residence, should provide many of the 
general jurisdiction advantages sought by US litigants’ resort to the “doing 
business” basis of jurisdiction. 
This Convention refines one of the Hague prohibited bases by 
distinguishing tangible from intellectual property, Art. 16.1(a) and (b).  
With respect to the former, tangible property directly related to an 
infringement action would include infringing articles, such as pirated 
books, phonograms, and videos, or counterfeit goods such as false brand 
name watches.  Relevant tangible property can also include the physical 
means for making the infringing goods or copies, such as computer 
hardware and media, recording equipment, and other machinery.  The kinds 
 
 157. See especially Austin, supra note 90, at 42–43. 
 158. See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82 (2nd Cir. 1998). 
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of physical devices whose presence in the State may suffice to afford 
jurisdiction are generally the kinds that courts are empowered to impound 
or destroy as a remedy in an infringement action. 159 
Art. 17: Authority of the Court Seized 
See the discussion of Art. 5. 
Art. 18: Verification of Notice 
As noted earlier in connection with Art. 5, the Convention contains 
two safeguards of the defendant’s right to notice.  This article requires the 
court of origin to, sua sponte, stay proceedings until it is established that 
the defendant received timely and sufficient information about the case to 
prepare  a defense.  Because Art. 25.1(c) makes lack of notice a ground for 
refusing to enforce a judgment, the enforcement court will also examine 
this issue.  Unlike the double -check on jurisdiction in Art. 21.2, the 
enforcement court is not bound by the factual findings of the court of 
origin.  The court of origin should, however, determine the adequacy of 
notice under the law of the court of origin. 160 
This provision was carried over from art. 20 of the 1999 Hague 
Convention and the comments of Nygh & Pocar are fully applicable.161 
Art. 19: Provisional and Protective Measures 
The time-value of information and the inability to return (or forget) 
what has been learned makes the availability of preliminary relief 
particularly important in intellectual property disputes.  This provision 
offers courts a great deal of flexibility in insuring the maintenance of the 
status quo pending adjudication. 
Art. 20: Definition of “Judgment” 
This provision is carried over from art. 23 of the 1999 Hague Draft 
and the comments in the Nygh & Pocar are applicable.162  Judgments of all 
courts of member States are to be enforced, no matter whether they are 
labeled orders, declarations of rights, decrees, or judgments.  However, 
they must resolve cases within the subject matter scope of this Convention.  
As noted in connection with Arts. 1 and 2, the narrow scope of this 
 
 159. See, e.g., for US  copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 506(b) (forfeiture and destruction), § 509 (seizure and 
forfeiture); for US trademarks, 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (destruction of infringing art icles).  See also TRIPs 
Agreement, supra  note 2, art. 46 (including in “other remedies” the “authority to order that materials 
and implements the predominant use of which has been in the creation of the infringing goods be . . . 
disposed of outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as to minimize the risks of further 
infringements”). 
 160. There is a proposal to make this explicit in art. 28(1)(d) of the Revised Hague Draft, supra 
note 49. 
 161. See Nygh & Pocar Report, supra  note 12, at 82–84. 
 162. Id. at 93–96. 
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Convention could lead to ambiguities on the issue of enforceability.  These 
ambiguities can, however, be resolved at the request of the parties by the 
court of origin, see Art. 23.1(a).  The decision is not subject to 
reexamination in the enforcement court. 
Art. 21: Verification of Jurisdiction 
See the discussion of Art. 5. 
Art. 22: Judgments Excluded 
This provision again makes clear that courts may exercise jurisdiction 
on bases not prohibited by this Convention.  However, if the basis is not 
listed in the Convention, then enforcement is determined by principles of 
comity.  This provision is taken from art. 24 of the 1999 Hague Draft.163 
Art. 23: Judgments to be Recognized or Enforced 
The comments of the Nygh & Pocar Report, at 96–100, are relevant 
here as well. 
In addition, this proposal stresses the role of the rendering court in 
declaring that its judgment comes within the scope of the Convention, Art. 
23.1(a).  Because this Convention endeavors to promote consolidation of 
territorial claims, notably, by providing for supplemental jurisdiction over 
claims outside this Convention’s subject matter when the claims arise out 
of the same transaction and occurrence as the intellectual property claim, 
see Art. 13, courts may be entertaining a variety of “mixed” cases.  Where 
the claim could be characterized as an intellectual property claim or as a 
contract or other related claim, the characterization may affect the 
applicability of the recognition and enforcement provisions of this 
proposal.  For example, suppose jurisdiction is asserted on the basis of 
copyright infringement, although a breach of contract claim has also been 
pleaded.  Under Art. 13, the court would be competent to adjudicate both 
claims.  In the course of the trial, it becomes clear that the dispute is 
essentially a contract one.  The court may retain jur isdiction, but it might 
choose to decline to declare that its judgment comes within the scope of the 
Convention, as a contract claim, divorced from infringement action, would 
not come within the Convention. 
Art. 24: Judgments Not to be Recognized or Enforced 
The provision is the analogue of art. 27 of the 1999 Hague Draft.164  It 
represents one of the essential ways in which this Convention is enforced in 
that it bars courts from enforcing judgments predicated on a basis of a 
prohibited ground of jurisdiction.  Note that the bar applies even if the 
 
 163. See id. at 96. 
 164. See id. at 101–03. 
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court of enforcement is in the same jurisdiction as the court of origin. 
Art. 25: Grounds for Refusal of Recognition or Enforcement 
Several of the grounds set forth are traditional and warrant no 
comment beyond those offered by Nygh and Pocar.165  Innovations 
peculiar to this instrument are found in Art. 25.1(a), (b), (d), and (h).  In 
addition, the application to intellectual property cases of the bases set forth 
in Art. 25.1(e) and (g) deserves commentary. 
Art. 25.1(a) and (b) add to the draft Hague Convention’s provision for 
nonrecognition of a judgment when the rendering court should have 
suspended its proceedings pursuant to the lis  pendens provision (Art. 12 of 
this proposal), the further ground of consolidation pursuant to Art. 13.  In 
order to promote the goal of consolidation, it is important not only to 
facilitate parties’ applications to consolidate, but also to discourage 
continued proceedings in other fora once an action has been consolidated.  
An effective way to discourage those proceedings is to deny recognition 
and enforcement to any resulting judgment. 
As with subsections 25.1(a) and (b), subsection (d) enforces another 
provision of the Convention (Art. 4.3) by denying enforcement of a 
judgment whose jurisdictional basis was created by a nonnegotiated 
contract that designated a forum lacking a reasonable relationship to the 
parties and the controversy.  Again, the hope is to motivate drafting parties 
to devise fair agreements. 
Art. 25.1(e) permits refusal of recognition or enforcement if “the 
judgment results from proceedings incompatible with fundamental 
principles of procedure of the State addressed, including the right of each 
party to be heard by an impartial and independent court.”  A question may 
arise as to whether the unavailability of discovery or of a jury trial in the 
action would be “incompatible with fundamental principles of procedure of 
the State addressed” when that State has jury trials.  As most States do not 
afford civil jury trials, it is unlikely that, as a matter of international norms, 
unavailability of a jury trial would violate fundamental principles.  
Moreover, even in States where jury trials are common, they may be 
regarded as necessary only for adjudication in courts where they are 
expressly required.  For example, the Seventh Amendment’s jury trial 
requirement is binding in the courts of the United States (federal courts), 
but it has never been viewed as binding in state courts.166  Moreover, issues 
decided in the absence of a jury may be binding for collateral estoppel 
 
 165. See id. at 103–10 (commenting on art. 28 of 1999 Draft Hague Convention). 
 166. See, e.g. , GEOFFREY C. HAZARD , ET. AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, STATE AND FEDERAL 
1121 (1999 ed.). 
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purposes, even in the proceedings of courts where a jury trial would have 
been required on the precluded issue.167 
The quality of discovery opportunities poses a more difficult problem 
[, particularly in patent cases,] as there may be substantive provisions of 
law that rely on a form of discovery available in the jurisdiction whose law 
is in issue, but not in the jurisdiction where the case is tried.  [An example 
from patent law is a defense of invalidity, where the ground is that the 
patentee was not the first to invent, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), and where 
laboratory notebooks may be a necessary part of the proof.]  In some cases, 
there may be opportunities for assistance from other tribunals, such as 
under The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or 
Commercial Matters, or pursuant to US federal law.168  However, where 
these procedures are not available, and the failure of proof is attributable 
directly to their absence, the court addressed should consider whether the 
absence gives rise to a lack of fundamental procedural fairness. 
Art. 25.1(g) deals with incompatibility with the public policy of the 
State of the court addressed.  The Nygh & Pocar Report emphasizes that 
this is intended to describe a narrow category of cases.169  That observation 
is even more true of this proposal.  This is not to deny that intellectual 
property raises difficult policy issues: exclusive control over information 
through copyright protection can violate free speech norms and undermine 
the political process.170  For example, the rendering court might prohibit 
the reproduction of a trademark in the context of a political commentary 
depicting the trademark on a t-shirt.  Or it might enjoin the public 
performance of a song parody.  Patent rights have direct impact on health 
and safety.171  Both patents and copyright can interfere with scholarly 
pursuits.  Thus, Qimron v. Shanks,172 the Israeli decision holding a 
rendering of the Dead Sea Scrolls copyrighted, has spawned considerable 
controversy.  This Convention has specific provisions to deal with some of 
these problems in a structured way, see, e.g., Arts. 25.1(h), 30, and 31.  
These provisions should be relied on before resorting to subsection (g). 
In some cases, the clash between an intellectual property decision 
 
 167. A US example is Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
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rendered by one court and the public policy of another State may occur 
because the rendering court failed to carefully consider what law ought to 
apply to the controversy.  To the extent this is true, the decision on 
nonenforcement should be made under subsection (h) of this Article, and 
not here. The commentary to that subsection sets parameters for 
determining whether an inappropriate law was utilized and therefore better 
frames the decision.  More important, making nonenforcement turn 
explicitly on choice of law will encourage courts to protect their decisions 
by articulating the basis for, and justification of, their choice of law 
decisions.  These opinions will also create a dialogue among courts on how 
choices of law should be made in an international marketplace. 
The impact of intellectual property decisions on the State addressed 
can also be softened through the remedy provisions of this Convention.  
Article 30.2(a) permits a court to reduce monetary damages so that the 
relief does not exceed the level that would have been awarded in the State 
of the court addressed.  In that way, the Convention makes sure that the 
decision to infringe is not any more expensive than it would have been in 
the State where enforcement is sought.  At the same time, Art. 31.1 allows 
the court addressed to refuse to enforce an injunctive order when health, 
safety, or fundamental cultural policies are at stake, so long as a monetary 
award can be had instead.  The approach of turning a property right into a 
liability rule in cases of fundamental policy has lately been endorsed by the 
United States Supreme Court.173  It is particularly appropriate in an 
international setting, where cultural differences and levels of technological 
development are so widely disparate.  Together, the remedy provisions 
make sure that the level at which infringement is deterred–or, the level of 
noncompliance with intellectual property law–in the State of the court 
where enforcement is sought is not substantia lly altered by reason of its 
joining this Convention. 
Given these other avenues for addressing policy concerns, subsection 
(g) should be reserved for cases where enforcing the judgment would cause 
extreme-manifest-incompatibility problems.  Permitting nonenforcement 
(or refusing to enforce elements of a judgment, such as an order for 
injunctive relief) under such conditions could, in fact, be considered of a 
piece with the TRIPs Agreement, which also contemplates the possibility 
that a general obligation imposed on all member States could have a 
 
 173. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994); see also Abend v. 
MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9 1988) (finding “special circumstances” that would cause “great 
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disparate impact for certain members.  Indeed, the provisions of TRIPs that 
deal with these situations could be used to elucidate the determination of 
when a judgment is manifestly incompatible with public policy.  For 
example, art. 27.2 of the TRIPs Agreement permits a State to exclude 
otherwise patentable subject matter from the scope of protection when 
“commercial exploitation . . . is necessary to protect ordre public or 
morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to 
avoid serious prejudice to the environment.” 
Similarly, art. 31(b) contemplates that efforts to obtain author ization 
for certain usages can be waived in the case of national emergencies or 
extreme urgency.  Finally, all of the major provisions of the Agreement 
permit limitations that do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the rights holder.174 
Art. 25.1(h) makes choice of law a potential ground for refusal of 
recognition or enforcement.  While this is not a choice of law convention, 
the forum’s choice of law rules are likely to influence what forum the 
parties choose. The issue of applicable law would therefore need to be 
confronted, at least indirectly, at some point.  By making arbitrary and 
unreasonable choice of law a ground for nonrecognition, this Convention 
aims to supply an incentive to courts to apply reasonable choice of law 
rules, and to reduce the fear that the territoriality of intellectual property 
rights will be lost.  The text of the draft simply suggests that laws lacking a 
significant relationship to the controversy are likely to be deemed 
unreasonable if applied.  To elaborate further, it is possible to identify what 
might constitute a signif icant relationship, or its absence.  In the case of 
registered rights, countries other than those in which the right was 
registered may have a significant relationship to the claim depending on the 
facts of the case; failure to apply the law of the country in which an 
intellectual property right was registered should not of itself furnish a 
ground for nonrecognition of the judgment, except in cases involving 
nullification of the registered right. 
In general, the following are presumptively reasonable choice of law 
rules in the digital distribution context, which is likely to be the major 
source of cases under a Convention such as this one; courts that depart 
from these rules should articulate justifications for departing from them:175 
 
 174. See TRIPs Agreement, supra  note 2, arts. 13, 17, 30; see also  WTO, Draft Declaration on the 
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1. The law applicable to the entirety of a defendant’s alleged Internet 
infringement is determined as follows: 
 a.  If the allegedly infringing content is found on a website, the law 
of the country in which the operator of the website has its 
residence or principal place of business, or 
 b. If the allegedly infringing content is not found on a website, such as 
through file sharing, the law of the country of the residence or 
principal place of business of the person or entity that initiated 
the communication. 
2. Notwithstanding #1, if a third country is shown to have a more 
significant relationship with the controversy–for example, if a third 
country is shown to have been the principal target of the infringing 
communication–then the law applicable to the entirety of the 
defendant’s alleged Internet infringement is the law of that third 
country. 
3. Notwithstanding ## 1 and 2, if the infringing communication was 
intentionally directed to a multiplicity of countries, in such a way that 
the country of initiation lacks a significant relationship to the dispute, 
but no single third country can be shown to be the principal target, or 
to have the most significant relationship to the dispute, then the laws 
of each country to which the communication was intentionally 
directed are applicable to that portion of the infringement occurring 
within each territory. 
4. In fashioning remedies, the court may take into account the extent to 
which, for particular countries in which acts alleged to be 
infringements occurred, the domestic law is substantially either more 
or less protective than the copyright or related rights law chosen in 
accordance with ## 1–2. 
A further choice of law problem may arise with respect to 
supplemental claims, including claims about subject matter not within 
TRIPs.  The State with the most significant relationship to those claims will 
usually be the  State(s) whose law(s) govern the main action.  This 
Convention does not attempt to propose choice of law rules for 
supplemental claims when the State with the most significant relationship 
is not the same as the State whose law governs the rest of the dispute, but 
failure to apply a law having some significant relationship to those claims 
could be a ground for nonrecognition or enforcement of so much of the 
judgment as concerns those claims, even if the law applied to the 
infringement claims was not arbitrarily chosen. 
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Art. 26: Documents to be Produced 
This provision was taken from art. 29 of the 1999 Hague Draft, see 
Nygh & Pocar Report.176 
Art. 27: Procedure  
This provision was taken from art. 30 of the 1999 Hague Draft, see 
Nygh & Pocar Report.177 The revision of the Hague Draft suggests 
imposing on the State of enforcement an obligation to provide an appeal of 
the enforcement decision.  A similar approach is under consideration for 
this Convention, on the theory that there is no court, like the US Supreme 
Court or the European Court of Justice where decisions under this 
Convention are otherwise reviewable. 
Art. 28: Costs of Proceedings  
This provision was taken from art. 31 of the 1999 Hague Draft, see 
Nygh & Pocar Report.178 
Art. 29: Legal Aid 
This provision was taken from art. 32 of the 1999 Hague Draft, see 
Nygh & Pocar Report.179 
Remedies: Arts 30-31 
Reconciling remedies affords one way to address disparities between 
different member States’ substantive norms.  This Convention attempts to 
achieve that goal both through its provisions on damages, and its provisions 
on injunctive relief.  In general, this proposal endeavors to limit the 
circumstances under which the enforcement court will be obliged to enter a 
remedy whose scope considerably exceeds the remedies that court would 
impose in a domestic infringement case.  At the same time, however, it is 
important to acknowledge that judgments entered pursuant to another 
jurisdiction’s appropriately chosen law incorporate the remedies envisioned 
by that law.180  Thus, assuming the rendering court’s judgment is not to be 
denied enforcement on the ground that the rendering court effected an 
unreasonable choice of law (Art. 25.(h)), the enforcement court should 
normally enter the remedy devised by the rendering court.  Several of the 
provisions of Arts. 30 and 31 recognize and seek to alleviate the tension 
between the objective of giving effect to the rendering court’s judgment 
and remaining reasonably consistent with the remedial norms of the 
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enforcement jurisdiction. 
Art. 30: Damages 
Art. 30.1 provides that the rendering court need not award 
noncompensatory damages in an amount greater than that which the 
rendering court would have awarded under domestic law; indeed, if 
domestic law allows for compensatory damages only, then the rendering 
court need not enter noncompensatory damages at all.  This provision thus 
is consistent with the goal of accommodating remedial disparities between 
member States.  At the same time, however, it includes a feature that 
distinguishes this provision from the 1999 Hague Draft on which it was 
based: compensatory relief that in the US is called “statutory damages,” 
that is, damages that are intended to compensate the plaintiff but without 
requiring proof of actual damages.  These are not considered exemplary or 
punitive damages, as they are designed to replace income or opportunities 
lost to infringement.  The rendering court typically has considerable 
discretion to set the award, although the statute may impose a floor and a 
ceiling.  Those States that award statutory damages vest judges with this 
discretion because they recognize that proving the amount of lost sales can 
be particularly difficult if the defendant has failed (deliberately or 
otherwise) to keep reliable business records.  An enforcement court does 
not have discretion to decline to enforce an award of statutory damages. 
Under Art. 30.2, the enforcement court may, within limits, reduce the 
amount of damages that must be paid.  Subsection 30.2(a) envisions the 
possibility of reducing a “grossly excessive” award, but only if the 
judgment creditor has an opportunity to be heard.  This subsection 
contemplates that the award may be considered “grossly excessive” under 
the law of the rendering jurisdiction as well.  Subsection 30.2(b) limits the 
enforcement court’s damage-reduction authority by imposing two floors: 
that of the enforcement jurisdiction, and that of the rendering jurisdiction.  
Thus, for example, if both jurisdictions calculate damages based on lost 
sales, but the enforcement jurisdiction deducts overhead from the lost sales 
figure, while the rendering jurisdiction does not, the enforcement 
jurisdiction must enter the award based on the rendering jurisdiction’s 
calculation. 
Art. 31: Injunctions  
This article allows the enforcement court to decline to enter injunctive 
relief under certain well-recognized circumstances, such as conflict with 
fundamental public policies, so long as “damages would afford an effective 
remedy” for the enforcement court’s territory.  While injunctions typically 
afford the most basic relief in intellectual property cases, courts, 
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particularly in the US, have recognized circumstances in which the public 
interest may be better served by permitting dissemination of the infringing 
work, while  requiring payment to the rightholder.181 
Because tensions between injunctive relief and domestic substantive 
or remedial norms may be present, yet may not, in a given case, be so 
pronounced as to call into play Art. 31.1’s public policy exceptions, Art 
31.2 refers to the international intellectual property minimum standards set 
forth in the TRIPs Agreement as an additional guide to a rendering court’s 
determination to enter an injunction which would not have been imposed in 
a purely domestic dispute.  Art. 31.2 allows, but does not oblige, the 
rendering court to decline to impose injunctive relief in circumstances in 
which local norms do not permit, and the TRIPs minima do not require, this 
remedy.  In that event, however, the enforcement court must afford 
compensatory relief. 
Art. 32: Severability 
This provision was taken from art. 34 of the 1999 Hague Draft, see 
Nygh & Pocar Report.182 
Art. 33: Authentic Instruments  
This provision was taken from art. 35 of the 1999 Hague Draft, see 
Nygh & Pocar Report.183 
Art. 34: Settlements  
This provision was taken from art. 36 of the 1999 Hague Draft, see 
Nygh & Pocar Report.184 
  
Addendum to Commentary on Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Judgments in Intellectual Property Cases 
To appreciate how the draft Convention’s proposals would work in 
practice, it may be useful to apply them to a hypothetical multi-territorial 
copyright dispute, based on an actual case recently filed in the Central 
District of California, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.185  In 
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Grokster, a Dutch enterprise, Consumer Empowerment (“CE”), produced, 
licensed, and distributed the “FastTrack” file sharing software, as part of an 
enterprise allegedly destined to become the “next Napster.”  CE operates 
the KaZaA website, located in the Netherlands.  It has licensed the 
FastTrack program to MusicCity, whose website is located in the US, and 
to Grokster, whose website is located in Nevis, a thirty-six-square-mile 
island in the West Indies.  The three websites carry advertising.  They also 
make the FastTrack program available to subscribers so that subscribers 
can exchange files of all kinds, not simply MP3 audio files, the kind of files 
at issue in Napster. 
Unlike Napster, whose website carried a centralized directory of titles 
currently available from all Napster users currently online, the MusicCity, 
KaZaA, and Grokster websites do not centralize the information that 
permits users to locate and copy available files.  Rather, this information is 
distributed across “super nodes,” computers participating in the MusicCity, 
KaZaA, and Grokster networks, whose speed and storage capacity make 
them desirable hosts of the directory information.  Owners and operators of 
“super node” computers do not necessarily know that their computers are 
being used for this purpose.  Subscribers to any one of the MusicCity, 
KaZaA, or Grokster services can access files belonging to subscribers to 
any of the other services, as well as to the same service.  Although the three 
services operate websites that reside on servers in particular territories, the 
services appear to accept subscribers from any location.  Thus, a US user 
might subscribe to the Dutch KaZaA service, and through that service 
acquire access to not only files residing on computers belonging to 
subscribers to the KaZaA service, but also to those belonging to subscribers 
to the US MusicCity service and to the Nevis Grokster service.  In order to 
acquire those files, the subscriber’s information location inquiry may pass 
through computers located throughout the world, whose owners or 
operators may subscribe to any one of the three services. 
The lawsuit asserts the liability for contributory copyright 
infringement by the three services, as well as their vicarious liability for 
subscribers’ infringements.  The US, the Netherlands, and Nevis are all 
members of the WTO.  Assume they have joined this Convention.  
Applying the criteria of this draft Convention, all three services are 
amenable to jurisdiction in the US.  Moreover, the US is the only forum in 
which all territorial claims against all three defendants could be asserted. 
MusicCity is subject to a US court’s jurisdiction on the basis of Art. 3, 
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as the US is that defendant’s residence.  The court’s jurisdiction would be 
general, entitling the court to hear infringement claims arising both within 
and without the territorial US.  Grokster is amenable to jurisdiction on the 
basis of Art. 6.2, intentionally directing the communication to the US.  The 
siting of Grokster in tiny Nevis appears pretextual, a resort to a “copyright 
haven” from which to target subscribers in other countries, particularly the 
US, as the US is likely to afford the largest market for Grokster’s services.  
Under Art. 6.2, when the basis of jurisdiction is targeting, and the 
plaintiff’s residence is the forum, the forum is competent to hear  not only 
claims arising in the forum’s territory, but worldwide.  CE would be 
amenable to suit in the US on the basis of Art. 6.2 with respect to its 
activ ities worldwide, if CE is found to be targeting.  But CE may plausibly 
claim a substantial home audience in the Netherlands or the European 
Community, to which its services are at least as “intentionally directed,” if 
not more so.  Even if it is not targeting the US, however, CE would remain 
subject to jurisdiction on the basis of Art. 6.3, because the infringements 
are foreseeable in the US, and CE has taken no steps to exclude US 
subscribers.  In this case, the US forum would not, however, have 
jurisdiction over CE with respect to acts occurring outside the US. 
Nonetheless, Art. 10 might enable the US court to broaden the 
territorial scope of its jurisdiction over CE.  When one of multiple 
defendants is habitually resident in the forum, Art. 10 permits proceeding 
against nonresident defendants if “the claims against the defendant 
habitually resident in that State and the other defendants are so closely 
connected that they should be adjudicated together to avoid a risk of 
inconsistent judgments,” and “as between the States in which the other 
defendants are habitually resident, and the forum, the forum is the most 
closely related to the entire dispute, and there is no other forum in which 
the entire dispute could be adjudicated.”  As the ensuing discussion will 
show, there is no other forum in which the entire dispute can be 
adjudicated.  Would inconsistent judgments result were the US court to 
adjudicate all claims except those involving CE’s conduct outside the US, 
and another court to adjudicate those claims?  If the other court, for 
example, a Dutch court, refrained from adjudicating the US claims, the 
judgments might at first appear to pose no risk of inconsistency.  But the 
judgments might nonetheless conflict if the U.S. court enjoined CE’s 
transmissions to US subscribers or availment of US super nodes, but the 
Dutch court ruled CE’s Netherlands-based conduct appropriate.  In that 
instance, the implementation of the US court’s remedy in Holland might be 
prejudiced, if not blocked.  It would be preferable to work through the 
territorial implications of the decision in a single action, rather than in the 
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piecemeal manner that fragmentation between US and Dutch fora would 
produce. 
Thus, under this analysis, all three defendants can be sued in the US 
with respect to the full territorial extent of the copyright owners’ claims, at 
least if the two foreign defendants are found to have “intentionally 
directed” their activities toward the U.S.  Moreover, no other court would 
be competent to adjudicate this range of claims; there would be no reason 
to consolidate elsewhere, pursuant to Art. 13, nor for the US court to 
decline jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 14.  The Netherlands and Nevis courts 
would have jurisdiction over at least part of the action, but not over all of it.  
The US and Nevis services would be amenable to suit in the Netherlands, 
because subscriptions to their services are available to Dutch users.  
Moreover, even Dutch users of the KaZaA service obtain the use and 
benefits of connections to the files of MusicCity and Grokster subscribers, 
thanks to the network of super nodes put in place by the common FastTrack 
software.  Thus, one can infer that some allegedly infringing activity is 
occurring in the Netherlands, that this activity is foreseeable, and that 
neither MusicCity nor Grokster have endeavored to keep out Dutch users.  
The same analysis may be made with respect to CE’s and MusicCity’s 
amenability to suit in Nevis.  This would make the nonresident services 
subject to suit in the Netherlands and Nevis, on the basis of Art. 6.3.  But 
this article limits the territorial competence of the forum to infringing acts 
occurring or impacting in the forum.  Thus, unless there is some basis for 
broader judicial competence, for example, under Art. 10, neither a 
Netherlands nor a Nevis court could hear the full territorial extent of the 
claim.  As plaintiffs reside in neither forum, that basis for extension of 
competence under Art. 6.2 is lacking.  Moreover, under Art. 6.2, the size 
and population of Nevis make it unlikely for the intentional direction of 
infringing files.  The Netherlands is a more significant market, but any 
contention that it is the economic center of gravity for the activities of the 
Nevis and US plaintiffs seems unpersuasive.  See Art. 14.3(b). 
With respect to choice of law, under the criteria suggested in the 
commentary to Art. 25(h) , the laws of each of the defendant’s princ ipal 
places of business (US, NL, Nevis) could reasonably apply to determine 
each defendant’s liability. 186  But Art. 25(h) also recognizes that another 
 
 186. Because this hypothetical concerns a claim alleging secondary liability, an initial question 
might be whether the forum should take account of the law(s) applicable to the primary infringements, 
or merely of the law(s) applicable to the services that facilitate or benefit from those infringements.  
Arguably, there can be no secondary liability unless the direct actors have themselves committed 
wrongful acts.  As the lawfulness of their acts would be determined according to the laws of the 
countries in which they acted, the laws applicable to the services who facilitate or benefit from their 
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country’s law may have a more significant relationship to the litigation, for 
example, when another country “is shown to have been the principal target 
of the infringing communication.”  In that event, “the law applicable to the 
entirety of the defendant’s alleged Internet infringement is the law of that 
third country.”  In the Grokster hypothetical, this would mean that US law 
could apply to the entirety of the claim against Grokster. 
By contrast, with respect to the claim against CE, if the court’s 
competence is limited to claims alleging infringement in the US, US law 
would certainly apply.  If instead, the US court has jurisdiction over the full 
territorial scope of the claim under Art. 6.2 or Art. 10, US law would not 
appropriately apply to the entirety of the claim, as US subscribers, while 
certainly a target of CE’s activities, may not constitute the “principal 
target.” But given the intentional direction of CE’s services to subscribers 
in other countries, if CE’s extraterritorial activities outweigh its domestic 
Dutch market, it would not be unreasonable under Art. 25 to apply the laws 
of the various countries in which CE has subscribers.  See criterion #3. 
Finally, with respect to all the defendants, even if the court chooses a 
single national law to apply to each defendant’s activities (US law with 
respect to MusicCity and Grokster; Dutch law with respect to CE), criterion 
#4 allows the court, in fashioning remedies, to “take into account the extent 
to which, for particular countries in which acts alleged to be infringements 
occurred, the domestic law is substantially either more or less protective” 
than the otherwise applicable law.  This could affect the court’s calculation 
of damages, or the scope of the injunction it issues. 
 
acts should be the same.  Putting aside the complicating factor of secondary liability, under the criteria 
suggested in the commentary to Art. 25(h), a starting point is likely to be the laws of the services’ 
residences.  Under criterion 1(a), “If the allegedly infringing content is found on a website, the 
[applicable law is the] law of the country in which the operator of the website has its residence or 
principal place of business.”  Criterion 1(b) provides: “If the allegedly infringing content is not found 
on a website, such as through file sharing, the [applicable law is the] law of the country of the residence 
or principal place of business of the person or entity that initiated the communication.”  Although the 
Grokster litigation concerns file sharing, one might contend that the entities that initiated the 
communications are those that distributed the file sharing software and control the network through 
which the file searches are made. 
